2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the plaintiff.

A. On July 11, 2001, the Plaintiff entered into a sales contract with the Plaintiff and Nonparty 1 on each of the lands listed in the separate sheet (hereinafter “instant land”) on which the purchase price was KRW 159 million, the down payment was paid KRW 10 million, the remainder payment, and the date of delivery of real estate as of December 10, 2001. On the same day, the Plaintiff received KRW 10 million, as the down payment from the said stuff.

B. At the time of the above sales contract, the Plaintiff and the Park Jong-dae entered into a special agreement with the seller, “The seller shall allow the accumulation of recycled materials on the instant land after the contract, and cooperate with a series of permitted matters, such as documents related to permission for temporary use of farmland and written consent to the use of land necessary for permission for the factory permission, submitted at the time of the buyer’s request: Provided, That at the time of the cancellation of the contract, the agreement stating that all the goods loaded on the instant land should be restored to its original state within 10 days, and even if the seller violates this, no objection shall be raised even if he voluntarily treats them.

C. Afterward, Park Jong-dae, in collusion with Nonparty 1, 23:00 on July 17, 2001 to 06:00 on July 18, 2001, dumped 180 commercial waste, such as waste vinyl and waste synthetic resin, which was entrusted with the disposal of the instant land by Nonparty 3 Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “the instant abandoned waste”).

D. On September 25, 2001, the Defendant ordered the removal of the instant abandoned waste by asking the first responsibility for the disposal of the instant abandoned waste, but did not properly perform the waste disposal, pursuant to Article 45(1)3 of the Wastes Control Act, on December 28, 2001, the Defendant ordered the Plaintiff, the owner of the instant land, and the instant abandoned waste to remove the instant abandoned waste.

[Ground of recognition] In the absence of dispute, Gap evidence 1 and 2, Gap evidence 5-5, 6, 8, 10 through 13, Gap evidence 6, Eul evidence 2 and 7, Eul evidence 2 and 7, testimony of the witness higher than the first instance court (not including the part not trusted in the front) and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether the disposition is lawful;

A. The parties' assertion

As to the Defendant’s assertion that the instant disposition was lawful by relevant statutes, the Plaintiff asserts that the instant disposition was unlawful on the following grounds.

(1) First, as at the time of the instant sales contract, the Plaintiff stated that, since the instant land is farmland, no materials cannot be stored without the permission to divert farmland, and that the Plaintiff consented to the use of the instant land without the permission to divert farmland, the Plaintiff used the instant land without the permission to divert farmland. However, the Plaintiff merely consented to the storage of recycled materials to the said stuff, etc. without the permission to divert farmland, and the Plaintiff did not consent to or implied consent to the disposal of industrial wastes, etc., and therefore, the Plaintiff does not constitute the counter-party to the order to remove abandoned materials as stipulated in Article 45(1)3 of the Wastes Control Act.

(2) Second, although the non-party Kim Jong-si observed the speculation of the instant waste and reported it to the Defendant, the Defendant failed to take appropriate measures, such as immediately preventing the additional waste disposal and returning the already dumped waste to the syllogic environment as the waste disposal truster, even though it did not take such measures.

B. Relevant statutes

The Minister of Environment, a Mayor/Do Governor, or the head of a Si/Gun/Gu may order a person falling under any of the following subparagraphs to change the methods of collection, transportation, storage, or disposal of wastes or to take other necessary measures within a specified period, where wastes are collected, transported, stored, or disposed of in a manner not in compliance with the standards referred to in Article 12:

1. A person who collects, transports, stores, or disposes of wastes;

2. Where the collection, transportation, or disposal of wastes is entrusted, a person who fails to confirm whether the trustee is capable of disposing of wastes in conformity with the standards pursuant to the provisions of Article 12;

3. Where he/she directly disposes of wastes or permits another person to use his/her own land, the owner of the land disposed of or reclaimed.

C. Determination

(1) Determination on the first argument

(A) First, as to whether the Plaintiff permitted the use of the instant land under the condition that the Plaintiff would obtain permission to divert farmland to the above stuff, etc., it is difficult to believe that the entries of No. 5-7 and the testimony of part of the witness of the court of first instance and the witness of the court of first instance, which seem consistent with the above, are in light of the contents of the special agreement under the above sales contract, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it. Moreover, according to the contents of the above special agreement, it is reasonable to deem that the Plaintiff allowed the above stuff, etc. to use the instant land first regardless of the permission to divert farmland

(B) In addition, comprehensively considering the above Gap evidence Nos. 5-5, 6, 8, 10, and 12 as well as the testimony of the above witnesses and the whole purport of the pleading, it is recognized that the plaintiff only consented to the above stuffing housing, etc. at the time of the sale and purchase of the land, and that there is no consent or implied consent to the disposal of industrial wastes, etc., but even if so, the "the owner of the land whose waste has been disposed of or reclaimed" is allowed to use his own land to another person as the other party to the order to take measures against waste disposal under Article 45 (1) 3 of the Wastes Control Act shall be interpreted as including the case where he allows another person to use his own land regardless of the purpose of the interpretation of the law, and there is no reason to interpret it as limited to the owner permitted to use his own land for waste speculation or reclamation. Thus, the plaintiff's above assertion cannot be accepted as a premise of such limited interpretation.

(C) Therefore, as long as the Plaintiff permitted stuffing housing, etc. to use the instant land for piling up recyclable materials on the instant land at the time of entering into the instant sales contract, the Plaintiff constitutes the counter-party to the order to take measures for waste disposal under Article 45(1)3 of the Wastes Control Act. Therefore, the first argument is without merit.

(2) Judgment on the second argument

The Defendant did not have any evidence to acknowledge that the instant abandoned wastes have occurred on the wind that the Defendant, even upon receiving the report of Nonparty Kim Jong-si, failed to take measures, such as immediately preventing additional dumping of the waste, etc. (i.e., all the abandoned wastes of this case were the 10 truck, but at the time of reporting to the police box, the 7 truck truck was in the state of leaving the site after dumping the waste, and the remaining 3 truck was in the state of dumping the waste.) The Defendant cannot be held exempted from the Plaintiff’s liability for the disposal of the abandoned waste of this case solely on the ground that the Defendant immediately did not take measures to immediately return the abandoned waste of this case to the tril environment, the truster for the disposal of the waste of this case. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s second assertion is without merit.

(3) If so, the instant disposition is lawful as it is in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim seeking revocation is dismissed on the premise that the disposition of this case is unlawful, as it is without merit, and the judgment of the court of first instance is just, and the plaintiff's appeal is without merit, and it is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Park Jong-hun (Presiding Judge)