1. With respect to the assertion that he did not have the intention of murder, the intention in the attempted murder includes the perception or prediction of the possibility of causing death to another person or of danger, and the willful negligence is recognized even if the perception or prediction is uncertain.

In addition, whether the Defendant had the intent to murder at the time of committing the crime ought to be determined by comprehensively taking account of the objective circumstances before and after committing the crime, such as the background leading up to the crime, motive for the crime, the type of deadly weapons prepared for the crime, the nature and repetition of the attack, and the likelihood of the occurrence of the result of the death (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2011Do11597, Nov. 24, 201). The lower court determined that the Defendant had the intent to murder the said victims, on the grounds as indicated in its reasoning, including the motive and background leading up to the use of force against the victim N andO, the type of deadly weapons used for the crime, and the method of use, including the attack and attack committed, on the grounds as

The decision was determined.

In light of the aforementioned legal principles and records, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding intentional murder in an attempt to murder as alleged in the grounds of appeal, or by misapprehending the logical and empirical rules.

2. According to Article 383 subparag. 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act as to the assertion that the sentencing of the lower court is unfair, an appeal is allowed only in cases where death penalty, life imprisonment, or imprisonment with or without prison labor for not less than ten years is declared, and thus, in this case where the lower court rendered a more minor sentence against the Defendant, the allegation that the sentence is excessive and unfair is not a legitimate appeal.

3. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.