[상해치사등·사체유기][공1980.10.15.(642),13128]
The case holding that the testimony prepared by the defendant by the police and by a police officer other than the investigative police cannot be admitted as evidence of guilt;
If there is no evidence to acknowledge the authenticity of a self-written statement prepared by the police by the defendant, and if it is deemed that the defendant was prepared by the police as a witness, it is difficult to acknowledge the Voluntary statement. If the contents of the witness testimony made by the police officer to himself/herself in the presence of the police officer in charge when the defendant was investigated as a suspect in the police, it shall be deemed hearsay evidence. Therefore, if it is difficult to deem that the statement made by the person in charge of the statement was made in a particularly reliable state, such evidence is inadmissible as evidence of guilt.
Articles 313 and 316 of the Criminal Procedure Act
Defendant
(National Office) Attorney Choi Young-young
Daegu High Court Decision 80No84 delivered on May 1, 1980
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to Daegu High Court.
We examine the Defendant’s grounds of appeal.
As the court below maintained the judgment of the first instance court, the evidence at the time and place of the charge of the crime of this case are comprehensively divided into two parts, and the defendant divided the part of the victim Kim Jung-spe into two parts, and made the victim to die in the left-hand side with a sacrife and pressure, and leave the body to sabbdominate.
In light of the records, it is clear that the defendant, from the prosecutor to the court of original trial, completely denies the facts charged in this case from the prosecutor's office to the court of original trial, and it does not agree to take all evidence-related facts against the defendant's rejection statement in the court of original trial as evidence of guilt.
However, if the court of first instance finds the testimony of the defendant at the police station (the investigation record 329) and the witness at the first instance court as evidence of guilt, the above statement can be acknowledged that it was made at will under particularly reliable circumstances in light of the witness's testimony, and the testimony at the above two intentions can be acknowledged that the contents of the testimony were made under particularly reliable circumstances in light of the defendant's attitude of cross-examination against the witness.
However, the above statement is prepared by the defendant after being examined by the police, and even based on the testimony of the above amount of the witness, it is not that the witness directly examines the process of the preparation. However, according to the testimony of the first instance court and the witness explanation of the court below, it is difficult to recognize the defendant's arbitraryness in the defendant's voluntary statement prepared under such circumstances (see, e.g., 275 of the trial record). The contents of the above witness's testimony are so-called hearsay evidence because the defendant made a confession statement to himself when he is investigated as a suspect by the police. This statement is made by the police at the time when the defendant, the original witness, was investigated by the police, and the police officer in charge of the investigation of this case did not have the position, and even if the defendant made this statement, it is hard to see that the defendant's statement was made under particularly reliable circumstances in light of the fact that the police officer in charge of the investigation of this case was a police officer in charge of the investigation of this case, although it is not dealt with.
If so, the court below accepted the defendant's ground of appeal on this point and reversed the judgment of the court below and remanded the case to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.
Justices Seo-ho (Presiding Justice)