A. The victims do not constitute workers under the Labor Standards Act.

2) Since the victim E re-enters on February 18, 2013 after retirement, the period of service prior to February 18, 2013, the date of re-admission of the victim E, should not be included in the calculation of retirement pay.

3) The Defendant entered into an interim settlement agreement with the victims on retirement allowances, and accordingly, paid monthly pay including retirement allowances every month.

B. Sentencing

2. Determination

A. In a case where an appellate court intends to reverse a judgment after re-evaluation of the first instance judgment, even though there is no new objective reason that may affect the formation of a documentary evidence in the course of the trial, there is a reasonable ground to deem that the first instance judgment was clearly erroneous, or that the argument leading to the acknowledgement of facts is considerably unfair because it is contrary to logical and empirical rules, etc. Furthermore, without such exceptional circumstance, the appellate court should not reverse without delay the judgment on the recognition of facts in the first instance judgment (see Supreme Court Decision 2016Do18031, Mar. 22, 2017). B. 1) With respect to the assertion that the Defendant does not constitute a worker under the Labor Standards Act, the lower court also argued that this part of the grounds for appeal are the same.

The lower court, as indicated in its reasoning, states the legal principles on the worker nature, <1> the victims appears to have been given fixed pay, etc. from the Defendant;2) the Defendant appears to have been able to direct and supervise the victims’ performance of duties according to the written labor contract; and3) the victim E was actually subject to direction and supervision by the Defendant in the court of the lower court.

Based on the fact that the victims stated to the purport that it is “,” the victims have provided their labor to the Defendant in substance.