2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.

Purport of claim and appeal

purport.

A. If a copy, original copy, etc. of a complaint was served by public notice, the defendant was not aware of the service of the judgment without negligence, unless there are special circumstances. In such a case, the defendant is unable to comply with the peremptory period due to the grounds for not being responsible and thus the defendant is entitled to file an appeal for subsequent completion within two weeks after such grounds cease to exist.

Here, “after the cause ceases to exist” refers to the time when a party or legal representative becomes aware of the fact that the judgment was served by public notice, rather than simply knowing the fact that the said judgment was served by public notice. In ordinary cases, barring any special circumstance, it shall be deemed that a party or legal representative becomes aware of the fact that the judgment was served by public notice only when he/she read the records of the case or received the

B. (See Supreme Court Decision 2004Da8005 delivered on February 24, 2006).

In this case, the first instance court served a copy of the complaint against the defendant and the notice of date for pleading, etc. by public notice, and proceeded with pleadings. On November 6, 2014, the judgment in favor of the plaintiff was rendered, and the original copy of the judgment was also served to the defendant by public notice, and the fact that the defendant received the original copy of the first instance judgment on December 30, 2019, and filed an appeal for subsequent completion on the same day with the knowledge that the original copy of the first instance judgment was served by public notice is obvious.

Therefore, the Defendant’s appeal for the subsequent completion of the litigation is a legitimate appeal that satisfies the requirements for subsequent completion of the litigation.

2. Basic facts

A. On February 25, 2003, the Plaintiff agreed from the Defendant to lease KRW 230 million from among the 2,3,4,8 (the 2,3, and 4th floor were operated by the Defendant’s limited restaurant) of the 2,3,4, and 8th floor (the 2, 3, and 4th floor was operated by the limited restaurant) of the 200 million lease deposit. From that time, the Plaintiff paid the Defendant a sum of KRW 146,000,000 to the Defendant up to March 29, 2003.

B. Meanwhile, on the other hand.