beta
(영문) 대법원 2015.06.24 2014다234513

소유권이전등기

Text

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Daegu District Court Panel Division.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. In a case where the nature of the source of possessory right of real estate is not clear, the possessor is presumed to have occupied in good faith, peace, and public performance with his own intent pursuant to Article 197(1) of the Civil Act. Such presumption is equally applied to the case where the State or a local government, which is the managing body of the cadastral record, etc., occupies the right of possession independently, such as sale and purchase or donation, but this is not recognized, even in a case where the possessor asserted the title of possession by himself/herself, the presumption

(2) The State, etc. is not obligated to submit the documents regarding the acquisition procedure of land for which the completion of acquisition by prescription is claimed. Therefore, even if the State, etc. failed to submit the documents regarding the acquisition procedure of land for which the completion of acquisition by prescription is claimed, considering the following: (a) the purpose and purpose of the possession; (b) whether the State, etc. made efforts to exercise the ownership on the cadastral record, etc. after the commencement of possession; and (c) the use or disposal of other divided land; and (d) the possibility that the State, etc. lawfully acquired the ownership as a result of the acquisition procedure of public property at the time of the commencement of possession cannot be ruled out, the presumption of self-ownership by the State, etc. is readily denied; and (b) the State, etc. is not recognized as an unauthorized occupancy.

(2) According to the reasoning of the lower judgment, the lower court recognized the following facts: (a) according to the reasoning of the lower judgment on March 27, 2014 (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2010Da94731, 94748, Mar. 27, 2014; 2012Da30168, Mar. 27, 2014). In so doing, the lower court recognized that the Plaintiff changed the land category of land cadastre relating to the Nam-gu B (hereinafter “instant land”) on December 5, 1975 to the road and provided it to the general public for traffic up to the present day: (b) while recognizing the fact that the Plaintiff changed the land category of land cadastre relating to each of the instant land into the road.