[손해배상(자)청구사건][하집1994(1),321]
The case holding that it is not an occupational accident in case where a company's vehicle suffers a traffic accident after obtaining boarding recommendations on the retirement path by chance;
On the way that the director of the company, the insured of the comprehensive insurance contract of business cars, has been used for the purpose of normal exit and retirement, five employees waiting the bus at the bus stops in front of the company's bus stops are found rapidly, and the injury of the employees is not an occupational accident in the event that the employees are different due to a traffic accident.
Article 78 of the Labor Standards Act
[Plaintiff, Appellant] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other (Law Firm Domin, Attorneys Park Jong-soo and 1 other, Counsel for plaintiff-appellant)
Plaintiff 1 and one other
Hyundai Maritime Fire Insurance Corporation
Seoul High Court Decision 93Da41148 delivered on January 25, 1994
1. The part of the judgment of the court below against the plaintiffs falling under the following order of payment shall be revoked.
The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff 1 the amount of 40,251,058 won, the amount of 5,000,000 won to the plaintiff 2, and the amount of 5% per annum from September 28, 1992 to June 22, 1994, and the amount of 25% per annum from the next day to the date of full payment.
2. The plaintiffs' remaining appeals are dismissed.
3. The total costs of the lawsuit shall be four equal costs, one of which shall be borne by the plaintiffs, and the remainder by the defendants respectively.
4. The part ordering a payment of money under paragraph (1) may be provisionally executed.
The judgment of the court below shall be revoked.
The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff 1 an amount of KRW 55,776,058, KRW 10,000 and each of the above amounts to the plaintiff 2,000,000 per annum from September 28, 1992 to the date of the decision of the court below, and the amount of KRW 25,00 per annum from the next day to the date of the full payment (the plaintiff has reduced his claim as above in the first instance).
1. Occurrence of liability for damages;
(a) Basic facts;
The following facts may be acknowledged in full view of Gap evidence Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, Gap evidence Nos. 8-4 through 16, and Gap evidence Nos. 9 and the whole purport of the pleadings, and no other counter-proof exists.
(1) On September 28, 1992, at around 18:00, Nonparty Hong Chang-ro, who operated a sports (vehicle number omitted)-related car owned by Nonparty Hakikid Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Nonindicted Company”), and proceeds from the Gyeonggi-do Drick-gun to the front side of the Jinsung-gun, when it comes to the front side of the Jinsung-gun, he did not operate the steering gear properly at the right side of the said car, left the road to the right side of the said car, and went to the right side, and caused the Plaintiff 1, who was on board the said car due to the shock, to suffer from the injury of the Jinho-gun, etc. on the front side of the said car.
(2) The fact that the non-party company entered into a comprehensive insurance contract for business cars with the defendant for personal compensation that the non-party company shall be liable for damages under the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act as a result of the operation of the above car with the insurance period from March 28, 1992 to March 28, 1993 and pay the prescribed insurance premium.
(3) The plaintiff 2 is the husband of the plaintiff 1.
B. Obligation to pay damages
Thus, barring special circumstances, the non-party company is responsible for compensating the plaintiffs for damages caused by the accident in this case as a person who operates an automobile for himself under Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act. Therefore, the defendant is liable for paying the above damages to the plaintiffs pursuant to Article 724 (2) of the Commercial Act and Article 2 (1) of the Addenda of the Commercial Act as an insurer who has entered into a comprehensive
C. Whether the defendant's exemption or liability is limited
(1) Determination as to the assertion that the non-compensation damage is non-compensation
According to Article 10-2 (4) of the General Terms and Conditions of Insurance for Business Motor Vehicles (hereinafter referred to as the "Terms and Conditions of Insurance"), the defendant stipulates that the accident in this case shall not be compensated if an employee of the insured who is liable for compensation dies or is injured by a person entitled to accident compensation under the Labor Standards Act. The accident in this case is a serious accident that passed through the bus stops where the above company's flag, which is the production director of the non-party company, is located after driving the above car, which is an automobile owned by the non-party company, and passes through the bus stops where the company's flag is located, and even if the above plaintiff is waiting for the bus on the leaving roads, the above plaintiff was subject to the accident in this case on the continuous leaving roads of the business. This constitutes an occupational accident and the company is subject to the Labor Standards Act, and therefore the above plaintiff can receive accident compensation from the non-party company, which is therefore, it cannot respond to the plaintiffs' claims.
In full view of each description of evidence No. 8-9 through 14, evidence No. 1, No. 2,4,5, and evidence No. 8-2 and all purport of oral argument, the Insurance Clause No. 10-2(4), which is a part of the General Insurance Contract for Business Motor Vehicles, provides that an employee of the insured subject to liability for accident compensation under the Labor Standards Act, who is eligible for accident compensation pursuant to the Labor Standards Act, shall not be compensated for the death of the insured. However, on the road that was used for the purpose of the smooth departure and retirement of the above red window which was used in the above car as a part of the General Insurance Contract for Business Motor Vehicles, five non-party companies, including Plaintiff 1, who was waiting for the bus at the bus stops prior to the bus stops of the non-party company, find the employees of the non-party company, including Plaintiff 1, who was waiting for the bus at the bus stops, and the fact that the non-party company was a business entity subject to the Labor Standards Act, and furthermore, can be acknowledged as to whether the accident of this case constitutes an occupational accident.
Even if a worker's act of commuting to the workplace is closely related to the business of providing labor, it cannot be deemed that the choice of the route is subject to the control and management of the ordinary user because the choice is reserved to the worker. Therefore, it should be considered that the worker's commuting to the workplace is under the control and management of the user, such as the worker's use of the means of transportation provided by the employer or the user's use of similar means of transportation, etc. (see Supreme Court Decision 92Nu16805 delivered on May 11, 1993). In this case, although the above plaintiff's act of commuting to the automobile was caused in the course of moving to the automobile of the non-party company which is the user, it is difficult to view that the above plaintiff's use of the automobile was under the control or management of the above passenger's vehicle because it is difficult to view that the above plaintiff's use of the vehicle was under the control of the non-party company's above passenger's vehicle because it was merely discovered that the above red bus was waiting to leave the workplace.
(2) Judgment on the assertion that it is an unauthorized operation
The defendant, while the above red window is operated only during business hours, operated without permission from the non-party company to the order of the company in addition to the business hours and only for his own interest, the non-party company lost the profit of operation or control of operation of the above motor vehicle. The plaintiff, who was the victim, was aware that the above red window was operated without permission, and shared the above red window and the profit of operation. Thus, the company is not liable for damages caused by the above accident.
According to the evidence revealed above, all of the vehicles of the non-party company are kept in knbs under the control of the chief of the general affairs division. The key of the vehicle is kept in knbs upon the completion of daily work hours. The fact that the non-party company is prohibited from private operation other than business hours, and is allowed to operate the vehicle with prior approval of the Seoul office in inevitable cases. The non-party company provided employees with a transit bus in cash, but the non-party company did not provide other transit means of transportation because it was paid in full to the employees leaving out and leaving the vehicle due to the accident prior to the accident of this case. The above red window did not follow the above procedure, but it can be recognized the fact that the above red window was used for moving out and leaving the above vehicle. Thus, it is difficult to see that the non-party company lost operating profit and control of operation of the above vehicle, and even if the above vehicle was operated without permission, there is no reason to view the above plaintiff's allegation that the above vehicle was without permission.
(3) Determination as to the assertion of reduction due to the hoscing and landing
The defendant asserts that the above plaintiff et al.'s boarding of the above car was forced by the above plaintiff et al. for the convenience and interest of the above plaintiff et al. without receiving any compensation as the above red window. Thus, the defendant asserts that the defendant's liability for damages caused by the above accident should be reduced by taking into account the damages to be paid by the defendant in determining the amount of damages to be paid by the defendant.
However, as seen above, it is not deemed unreasonable in light of the principle of good faith and equity to impose any negligence on the above plaintiff, or to impose any liability like the case of a general traffic accident on the part of the perpetrator. Thus, the above argument by the defendant is not accepted.
(4) Determination on the assertion of comparative negligence due to excess boarding of the seating capacity
The defendant asserts that since the above plaintiff has contributed to expanding the scope of damage by getting in excess of the fixed number of passengers when boarding the above car, it should be taken into account in determining the amount of damage to be compensated by the defendant.
According to the evidence from the above, one of the above plaintiff while on duty when the above plaintiff is on board the above car can be found to have exceeded the prescribed number by boarding the back seat. However, there is no evidence to prove that the above plaintiff's boarding beyond the prescribed number contributed to the occurrence of the accident of this case and the expansion of damage caused thereby, the above argument of the defendant is without merit.
2. Scope of damages.
(a) Actual income:
The loss of lost income equivalent to the monetary total appraised value of the capacity to operate as a result of the instant accident is 22,781,558 won calculated at the present price at the time of the instant accident, based on the fact of recognition and evaluation as follows: (a) the amount of loss is 22,781,558 won calculated on the basis of the method of deducting intermediate interest at the rate of 5 percent per month, as follows:
(1) Facts of recognition and evaluation
(a) Gender category: Female; and
Date of birth: June 15, 1937
Age at the time of accident: 5 years of age and 3 years of age;
Name of rental: 24.08
(B) Monetary assessment of operating capability: Income level of a general urban worker who operates on 25th day of each month, 482,500 won per month from the date of the instant accident until December 31, 1992 (gold 19,300 won x 25), 530,000 won per month from January 1, 1993 to December 31 of the same year (gold 21,200 won x 25), and 557,500 won per month from January 1, 1994 to the maximum working age (gold 22,300 won x 25).
(1) The defendant alleged that the above plaintiff's actual income should be based on the above actual income that the above plaintiff acquired at the time of the accident at the time of the accident at the time of the accident at issue. However, even if the plaintiff was employed, if the income falls short of the daily wage, it is probable that he will be engaged in daily labor. In addition, since the plaintiff had a minimum amount of daily labor ability, and the victim had a little amount of income at the time of the accident at the time of the accident at the time of the accident, it cannot be assessed to lower the value of the labor ability by such circumstance alone. Thus, the defendant's argument is without merit)
(c)the ratio of loss of operational capacity to the aftermath disability and the general urban worker;
(a) Ethy disability: Ethical disorder and ethymopathic loss;
A) Grade of disability on the Mabrid’s assessment table: Between the two parts of table 14-2, brain, and scale of water, corresponding to Section 8-B-4, and Section 6 of table 6 for the loss of vision of Mabrid’s vision.
(i)Operational capacity loss rate: approximately 82% of the overlapping disability rates in the above two paragraphs.
(D) Treatment period: In case of hospitalized treatment at an gambling hospital from the date of the accident to January 5, 1993;
(e) Maximum working age: Before reaching 60 years of age (based on experience)
(Evidence Doz.)
The evidence Nos. 1, 6-1, 6-2, 9, 11, 12, and 14-1, 2-2, and the result of the commission of physical examination to the chief of the hospital of the lower court, the whole purport of the oral argument.
(ii)Calculation (if the last month is less than the calendar month, it shall be charged in sequence in the period in which the income is less than the calendar month and less than the calendar month, hereinafter the same shall apply).
(A) Three months from the date of the accident to December 31, 1992, which occurred from the time of the completion of hospital treatment.
gold 482,50 won x 2.9752 = gold 1,435,534 won
(B) between 12 months from the next day to 31 December 1993
gold 530,000 won ¡¿ 0.82 】 (14.5205-2.9752) = gold 5,017,587 won
(C) 41 months from the following day to the age of 60.
gold 557,500 won ¡¿ (50.2384-14.5205) = gold 16,328,437 won
(D) Total 2,781,558 won (gold KRW 1,435,534 + 5,017,587 + 16,328,437)
(b) Nursing expenses;
(a) Nursing: Non-party Woo-si (Plaintiff 1);
Opening period: 100 days from the date of the above accident to January 5, 1993, for which hospitalized treatment has been completed.
From the date of the accident to December 31, 1992, 21,200 won per day, 19,300 won per day, which is the general urban daily wage in 1992 as above, and 5 days from the next day until January 5, 1993, 200 won per day, which is the general urban daily wage in 193 as seen above.
(Evidence Doz.)
Gap evidence No. 13, the whole purport of the pleading
(2) mountain.
Total amount of 1,939,500 won (gold 19,300 won x 95 + 21,200 won x 5)
(c) Expenses for medical treatment and medical appliances;
(a) C. T. T. T. photography costs: 280,000 won (the expenditure on September 29, 1992 and October 6 of the same year); and
(b) Purchase cost of crypt: 250,000 won (purchase on October 9, 1992 for physical therapy)
(3) Total amount of KRW 530,000 (gold KRW 280,000 + KRW 250,000)
(Evidence Doz.)
Evidence No. 10-1, 2, 4, and 13
(4) The plaintiff 1 alleged that he suffered losses from expenditure of 525,00 won for medical expenses on January 5, 1993. Thus, according to the statement in the evidence No. 10-3 of this case, it can be acknowledged that the above plaintiff paid a gold of 525,00 won to the above Park Inado Hospital with the difference in the amount of difference in the amount of difference in the amount of loss. However, this is beyond the ordinary scope of damages, and it is difficult to view this part of the plaintiff's claim is without merit.
D. Judgment on the Defendant’s assertion of mutual aid
The defendant asserts that since the defendant paid 5,290,00 won to the above Park Indones Hospital as medical expenses for the injury of the plaintiff 1 on behalf of the non-party company who is the insured, the defendant should deduct the amount equivalent to the above plaintiff's ratio of negligence from the amount of damages to be paid by the defendant. However, as seen above, the above defendant's claim for the above deduction on the premise that there is no reason to reduce the above plaintiff's negligence or the defendant's damages in relation to the accident of this case is without merit.
(e) consolation money;
(1) Reasons for consideration: The plaintiffs' age, family relation, property and education degree, background of the accident, the degree and degree of injury and the disability in the aftermath, treatment period, and other various circumstances shown in the arguments in this case.
(2) The amount determined;
Plaintiff 1: 15,00,000 won
Plaintiff 2: 5,000,000 won
3. Conclusion
Thus, the defendant is obligated to pay to the plaintiff 1 the amount of 40,251,058 won (22,781,558 won in daily actual income + 1,939,500 won in nursing expenses + 530,000 won in daily allowances + 15,000,000 won in daily allowances, and 5,000,000 won in daily allowances and each of the above amounts to the plaintiff 2 from September 28, 1992 to June 22, 1994, which is the date of the accident, to pay damages for delay at each rate of 5% per annum as stipulated in the Civil Act, and from the next day to the date of full payment, 25% per annum as stipulated in the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings.
Therefore, the plaintiffs' claims of this case are accepted within the above scope of recognition, and the remaining claims are dismissed, without merit. Since the judgment of the court below is unfair by dismissing all the plaintiffs' claims with some different conclusions, it is so decided as per Disposition by accepting part of the plaintiffs' appeal.
Judges Doese (Presiding Judge) defects in red type