난민불인정결정취소
1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.
2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
1. In the course of the disposition, the following facts: (a) the status of stay exemption (B-1) on July 23, 2015, the date of the application for refugee status exemption (B-1) on July 23, 2015, the date of the application for refugee status recognition (hereinafter “instant disposition”) on July 7, 2016; (b) the date of the application for refugee status recognition; (c) the date of the decision on September 22, 2016; (d) there is no dispute over the recognition of the decision of rejection on April 21, 2017; (d) the facts that there is no ground for the determination of rejection of the decision of April 21, 2017; (e) Gap’s evidence 1 through 4; and (e) the purport of the entire pleadings;
2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful
A. The Plaintiff’s assertion is a national of the Russia Federation (hereinafter “ Russia”).
The plaintiff was Buddhistdo, and since September 2003, the plaintiff started to attend a church, and was now opened as a shot school around the above time.
As such, the families of those who do not know themselves threatened with the plaintiff by assaulting them.
Accordingly, the plaintiff has been in the Republic of Korea since Russia.
As such, the Plaintiff’s return to Russia is likely to harm his/her family members, and thus, he/she should be recognized as a refugee.
B. Determination 1) Article 2 Subparag. 1 of the Refugee Act defines refugee status as “a foreigner who is unable to be protected or does not want to be protected by the country of nationality due to well-founded fear to recognize that he/she may be injured on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a specific social group, or political opinion, or a foreigner who is a state of nationality not having been unable to return to or does not want to return to the country in which he/she had resided before entering the Republic of Korea due to such fear.” 2) In full view of the evidence and evidence in subparagraph 3 and the following circumstances revealed in the statement in subparagraph 3, the Plaintiff cannot be deemed to have “a well-founded fear of being injured on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a specific social group, or political opinion,” and it may be recognized otherwise.