아동ㆍ청소년의성보호에관한법률위반(알선영업행위등)등
Defendant
All appeals filed by A and prosecutor are dismissed.
1. Summary of grounds for appeal;
A. Defendant A1) The referral of sexual traffic to Defendant A’s G and minors J was limited to three times each, and one time each.
Nevertheless, the court below held that the above defendant acted as a broker for commercial sex acts, or "business" as a broker for commercial sex acts by children and juveniles.
The decision is a crime of mistake that affected the conclusion of the judgment by mistake of facts.
2) The sentence of sentence against Defendant A (a prison term of three years and six months) of the lower court’s unfair sentencing is too unreasonable.
B. The Prosecutor’s sentence of the lower court on Defendant B (the sentence of imprisonment with prison labor for 6 months) (the sentence of the suspended sentence of 6 months) is too uneased and unreasonable.
2. Determination
A. As to the Defendant A’s assertion of mistake of facts, the lower court also made an assertion to the same effect as the grounds for appeal in this part. The lower court rejected the Defendant’s assertion in detail with the relevant legal principles and the judgment on the assertion of Defendant A and his defense counsel.
The court below held that the defendant A would seek a resident registration certificate of J while soliciting sexual traffic to J, as shown in the evidence duly admitted and investigated by the court below, as follows: < Amended by Presidential Decree No. 17517, Feb. 29, 199>
(2) The above defendant will provide tobacco bruced rice if he/she engages in sexual traffic.
shall be entitled to work in a timely manner.
In addition, the above decision of the court below is justified, and there is no error of mistake of facts as pointed out by the above defendant.
Defendant
A’s assertion of mistake of facts is without merit.
B. In the absence of change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the first instance court with respect to each of the unfair claims by Defendant A and the prosecutor, and in the event that the first instance sentencing does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to respect it (Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015).