A. The Defendant, as stated in the facts charged, did not have any perception or intent to obstruct the performance of official duties, by misunderstanding of facts or misunderstanding of legal principles, by scambling police officers or blocking street, etc.

B. The punishment of the lower court is too heavy.

2. Determination

A. Determination on the misunderstanding of the facts or misapprehension of the legal principles 1) The purport of the crime in the obstruction of the performance of official duties is to recognize the other party's duty as a public official, and that the other party uses violence or intimidation against it, and the recognition is so-called so-called "unwritten intention" even if it is uncertain.

It does not require an intention to interfere with the execution of official duties (see Supreme Court Decision 94Do1949 delivered on January 24, 1995, etc.). In addition, violence referred to in the obstruction of performance of official duties includes not only the exercise of direct tangible power against public officials but also the exercise of indirect tangible power.

On the other hand, considering the difference between the first instance court and the appellate court's method of evaluating credibility according to the spirit of substantial direct deliberation adopted by the Korean Criminal Procedure Act, the first instance judgment on the credibility of the statement made by the first instance court was clearly erroneous in light of the contents of the first instance judgment and the evidence duly examined by the first instance court.

Except in exceptional cases where it is deemed significantly unfair to maintain the first instance judgment on the credibility of a statement made by a witness of the first instance court by taking account of the results of the first instance examination and the results of the further examination of evidence conducted until the closing of pleadings at the appellate court, the appellate court shall not reverse without permission the first instance judgment on the sole ground that the first instance judgment on the credibility of a statement made by a witness of the first instance court is different from the appellate court’s judgment (see Supreme Court Decision 2008Do7917, Jan. 30, 2009, etc.).