2. In light of the fact that the sentencing based on the statutory penalty is a discretionary judgment that takes place within a reasonable and appropriate scope, taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing under Article 51 of the Criminal Act, and the fact that the sentencing of the first instance court does not change in the conditions for sentencing compared with the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to respect it. Although the first instance court’s sentencing falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, it is desirable to reverse the first instance court’s judgment and to refrain from imposing a sentence that does not differ from the first instance court’s opinion on the grounds that it is somewhat different from

(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015). In light of the following, there is no change in the sentencing conditions compared with the original judgment as the materials for new sentencing have not been submitted in the trial and the sentencing grounds revealed in the process of the argument in this case, it does not seem that the lower court’s sentencing is too unfilled and so it exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion.

3. In conclusion, the prosecutor's appeal is dismissed in accordance with Article 364 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

(However, pursuant to Article 25(1) of the Regulation on Criminal Procedure, the “three weeks” of the 20th page No. 20 of the judgment of the court below is changed to each “three weeks,” and the judgment of the court below is corrected.