Defendant

E. One year of imprisonment.

A. The first instance court's sentence imposed on the Defendants (for Defendant A, 8 months of imprisonment, 2 years of probation, 80 hours of community service order, 80 hours of probation, 1 year and 6 months of probation, 4 years of probation, probation, 200 hours of community service order, Defendant C: imprisonment for one year, 3 years of probation, 3 years of probation, 120 hours of probation, 120 hours of probation, 8 months of probation, 2 years of probation, 80 hours of probation, 80 hours of probation, 3 years of probation, 80 hours of probation, 80 hours of community service order, Defendant E: imprisonment for six months of probation, 3 years of probation, 80 hours of probation, 2 years of probation, 80 hours of community service order, 80 hours of probation, etc.).

B. The punishment sentenced by the first instance court (one year and six months of imprisonment, four years of suspended sentence, probation, and community service order 200 hours) is too unreasonable.

C. The punishment sentenced by Defendant E (the first instance court: six months of imprisonment, three years of probation, probation, community service order 80 hours, the second instance court: imprisonment with prison labor for 10 months of probation, two years of probation, probation, and community service order 120 hours) is too unreasonable.

2. Determination:

A. Prior to the judgment on the assertion of unfair sentencing by Defendant E and the prosecutor, Defendant E and Defendant E appealed against the judgment below, and this court decided to jointly deliberate on each of the above appeals cases.

However, since each crime in the judgment of the first and second instance against Defendant E is in a concurrent crime under the former part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act, a single sentence should be sentenced within the scope of the term of punishment for concurrent crimes under Article 38(1) of the Criminal Act.

In this respect, the part concerning defendant E and the second judgment of the first judgment cannot be maintained any more.

B. The sentencing of Defendant B is based on the statutory penalty, based on the fact that the discretionary determination is made within a reasonable and reasonable scope, taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing under Article 51 of the Criminal Act, and the nature of the appellate court’s ex post facto review.