1. As to the grounds of appeal by Defendants B, C, D, E, and F, the crime of interference with business is established when a person interferes with another’s business by deceptive means or by force (Article 314(1) of the Criminal Act). The term “defensive force” here refers to any force that may interfere with another’s free will.

On the other hand, the strike as an industrial action that obstructs the normal operation of business by refusing to provide labor for the purpose of accomplishing his/her claim, is not merely an omission of refusing to provide labor under a labor contract, but is an exercise of the power to collectively suspend the provision of labor to accomplish the worker's claim by imposing pressure on the employer, and thus, includes the elements of force as referred to in the crime of interference with business.

However, workers have the right to independent association, collective bargaining, and collective action (Article 33(1) of the Constitution) as fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, and thus, strike as an industrial action does not always constitute the crime of interference with business. However, in light of the previous and previous circumstances and circumstances, etc., if it is deemed that the employer’s free will on the continuation of business may be subject to suppression and confusion due to the fact that the refusal to provide collective labor constitutes force and thus constitutes the crime of interference with business.

(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 2007Do482 Decided March 17, 201, and Supreme Court Decision 201Do7045 Decided November 10, 201, etc.). Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the aforementioned legal principles and records, the lower court is justifiable to have determined that the Defendant was guilty of committing a crime of interference with business among the facts charged in the instant case against the said Defendants on the grounds stated in its reasoning, and contrary to logical and empirical rules.