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(영문) 수원지방법원 2017.08.29 2017나57530

손해배상(기)

Text

1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.

Reasons

1. The reasoning of the court of first instance’s explanation concerning this case is as follows: (a) deleted “2015.” (b) the second and fifth intermediate part of the judgment of the first instance; and (c) the Plaintiff’s ground for appeal was stated in the reasoning of the first instance judgment, except for the addition or supplementary determination as follows 2. As such, the Plaintiff’s ground for appeal is identical to the reasoning of the first instance judgment; and (d) thus, it is acceptable in accordance

2. Parts to be added and supplemental; and

A. The Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant, etc. may not terminate the instant agreement on the ground that it was attributable to the Defendant’s failure to cancel the superficies established on the instant land before filing an application for a building permit, on September 24, 2015, that the Plaintiff violated the instant agreement by obtaining a building permit on September 24, 2015.

However, it is difficult to recognize that the evidence submitted by the Plaintiff alone was delayed to obtain the building permit of each of the instant lands due to the reasons for not cancelling superficies, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it otherwise.

Rather, according to the contents of the instant agreement, only agreed to the effect that “the whole of the construction permit approval within three months after the conclusion of the contract and the right to the down payment and the progress of the construction works which were not commenced within six months shall belong to the Defendant, etc.,” and as at the time of the instant agreement, there was no obligation between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, etc. to approve the construction permit, such as the cancellation of superficies on the part of the Defendant for the purpose

B. In addition, the Plaintiff asserts that even if the Defendant, etc. acquired the right of termination, insofar as it delegated the right of representation to the Plaintiff regarding the application for partition of land on November 20, 2015, it constitutes a case where the right of termination is waived or it is impossible to exercise the right of termination under the good faith principle.

In the instant case, spam, etc.