2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The disposition of imposition of capital gains tax of KRW 360,468,960 against the plaintiff on November 1, 2016 by the former defendant of the Gu office shall be revoked.

A. On June 20, 2003, the Plaintiff purchased 770 square meters in a purchase price of 547,50,000 square meters from ○○○○○-○○○○, ○○, ○○, ○○, ○○, ○○, and 770 square meters. On September 15, 2003, the Plaintiff purchased 122 square meters in a purchase price from ○○-○, 00,000 square meters in a purchase price from ○○, ○○, ○○, ○○, ○0.

B. Among 42 square meters in 00 square meters in 00,000 in 00,000 in 00,000 in 00,000 in 00,000,000 in 770 square meters in 00, eight square meters in 00,000 and 122 square meters in 0,000, were expropriated in 00 and was divided from the said land on March 24, 2008. On July 10, 2015, the Plaintiff: (a) sold to 0,000,000 square meters in purchase; (b) sold to 0,000,000,000 square meters in 0,000 in 0,000 won in 1,470,000,000 in 0; and (c) transferred the ownership registration on the instant land to 0,000 on August 27, 2015.

D. Upon filing a preliminary return of capital gains tax on October 31, 2015, the Plaintiff reported and paid KRW 8,045,106 to the Plaintiff by applying special long-term holding deduction of KRW 257,588,464 on the premise that the instant land falls under one of his/her own farmland for at least eight years, and the capital gains tax reduction of KRW 200,000,000 under Article 69(1) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act.

E. The Defendant conducted an investigation of the Plaintiff’s preliminary return of capital gains tax, and failed to meet the requirements for reduction or exemption of capital gains tax on self-owned farmland, and deemed that it did not constitute those subject to the special deduction for long-term holding, and notified the Plaintiff of capital gains tax of 360,468,960 on November 1, 2016 (hereinafter “instant disposition”).

F. The Plaintiff appealed and filed an appeal with the Tax Tribunal on January 2, 2017.

Facts that there is no dispute over recognition, Gap evidence 1, 3 through 5 (including each number, hereinafter the same shall apply), Eul evidence 1, and the purport of the whole pleadings.

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. The plaintiff's assertion

Since the Plaintiff, while directly cultivating the instant land for not less than eight years, sells the instant land and continues to grow after acquiring other farmland, the Plaintiff satisfies the requirements for reduction or exemption of capital gains tax for self-arable farmland for not less than eight years as stipulated in Article 69(1) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act, satisfying the requirements for reduction or exemption of capital gains tax for farmland substitute land under Article 70 of the same Act, and is subject to special long-term holding deduction under Article 95 of the Income Tax Act, and on the other hand, the introduction fee paid by the Plaintiff while acquiring the instant

B. Relevant statutes

It is as shown in the attached Form.

C. Determination

1) Determination as to whether to grant reduction or exemption from self-arable farmland or farmland substitute land, and special long-term holding deduction

The burden of proving the fact, etc. of directly cultivating the transferred land as a requirement for reduction or exemption of capital gains tax due to self-arable land is against a taxpayer who asserts reduction or exemption of capital gains tax (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2002Du7074, Nov. 22, 2002). In light of the following circumstances, the aforementioned evidence and the records as indicated in Articles 6 through 12, 25, and 2 through 5, and the witness witness witness witness’s testimony in addition to the overall purport of the pleadings, the Plaintiff cannot be deemed to have cultivated the instant land for more than 8 years and 4 years, and the Plaintiff did not meet the requirements for reduction or exemption of capital gains tax, and the Plaintiff did not cultivate the land for more than 40/100 during the period of ownership, and thus, the instant land cannot be subject to special deduction for long-term possession as it constitutes a non-business land. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s aforementioned assertion is without merit.

① In the case of land of 114 square meters in ○○○○-ri, ○○-ri, ○○○-ri, ○○○-ri, 114 square meters, the Plaintiff was registered in the farmland ledger only after July 20, 2015, following the conclusion of a sales contract with the formerCC, which cannot serve as a basis for supporting the Plaintiff’s self-defination at the time of transfer. Furthermore, with respect to ○○○-○-○, 728 square meters in the farmland ledger, the Plaintiff’s self-defination on October 14, 2003, which was registered on the farmland ledger and transferred the land, was deleted on September 2, 2015, which was after the Plaintiff transferred the land, but the Plaintiff continued to lease the said land to ○○○-ri, ○○-ri, and △△△, Inc., a corporation established by the said company as an open site for the farmland ledger. Furthermore, the Plaintiff’s situation where the farmland ledger and the farmland were not fully prepared to effectively implement the farmland policy.

② On June 9, 2009, after the Plaintiff acquired the instant land, the Plaintiff registered the fact of self-sufficiency on the instant land while registering an agricultural business entity on June 9, 2009. However, the National Agricultural Products Quality Control Service did not determine whether the Plaintiff continuously maintained the instant land after the Plaintiff solely based on the above data, since the Plaintiff was merely engaged in a field investigation only when the management owner applied for registration. In fact, even though the instant land was used as an open site for a considerable period of time, the registration certificate of an agricultural business entity is not entirely reflected in such circumstance, and is still registered as an independent land. In light of the fact that the registration certificate of the agricultural business entity is not a document supporting the Plaintiff’s self-sufficiency. Meanwhile, the part written by the Plaintiff as to the fact of self-reliance on the registration certificate of the agricultural business entity (

③ Although the Plaintiff intended to receive subsidies for rice income from other land owned by the Plaintiff from around 2006 to around 2016, the Plaintiff did not receive subsidies for rice income from the instant land. Moreover, the Plaintiff purchased agricultural chemicals or fertilizers once on or around February 6, 2009, three times on or around 201, three times on or around 201, one time on or around 201, one time on or around 201, and two times on or around 2014, but some of them were purchased after the time when the instant land was used as the site or transferred to the formerCC. Accordingly, it is difficult to view that the Plaintiff purchased the instant land to have been used as the agricultural company for the instant land. Meanwhile, there is no evidence to support the Plaintiff that the Plaintiff purchased agricultural chemicals or fertilizers prior to around 2009, which the Plaintiff asserted that the instant land had never been farming.

④ Even if it is based on the airline margin from around 2002 to around 2015 on the instant land, it is unclear as to whether the instant land was used as farmland, and even if it was used as farmland for snow shed, it cannot be said that the Plaintiff directly cultivated it.

2) Determination as to whether necessary expenses are deducted

In light of the evidence No. 21, the Plaintiff’s sales and service charges incurred by the Plaintiff in acquiring the instant land are insufficient to be recognized as necessary expenses prescribed in Articles 95(1) and 97 of the former Income Tax Act (Amended by Act No. 13426, Jul. 24, 2015); and Article 163(5) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act (Amended by Presidential Decree No. 26982, Feb. 17, 2016); and there is no other evidence to acknowledge this otherwise, the Plaintiff’s assertion is without merit.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is dismissed as it is without merit, and it is so decided as per Disposition.