2. In light of the fact that the sentencing based on the statutory penalty is a discretionary judgment that takes place within a reasonable and appropriate scope, taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing under Article 51 of the Criminal Act, and the fact that the sentencing of the first instance court does not change in the conditions for sentencing compared with the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to respect it. Although the first instance court’s sentencing falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, it is desirable to reverse the first instance court’s judgment and to refrain from imposing a sentence that does not differ from the first instance court’s opinion on the grounds that it is somewhat different from

(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015). In the instant case, there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the lower court’s judgment, and even if the lower court considers the Defendant’s criminal punishment history, inclination, necessity to prevent recidivism, and the degree of damage incurred from the instant crime as disadvantageous to the Defendant, the lower court’s sentence is too unfasible and is deemed to have exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion.

3. In conclusion, the prosecutor's appeal is dismissed in accordance with Article 364 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act on the ground that it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.