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(영문) 서울행정법원 2011. 6. 30. 선고 2010구합48001 판결

[재정결함지원금반납고지처분취소][미간행]

Plaintiff

The East School Foundation and seven others (Law Firm Future, Attorneys Park Jong-woo et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant

The superintendent of the Office of Education (Law Firm Yang Jae, Attorneys Choi Byung-mo et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Conclusion of Pleadings

May 31, 2011

Text

1. All of the plaintiffs' claims are dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit are assessed against the plaintiffs.

Purport of claim

The Defendant’s disposition on December 15, 2010 against the Plaintiff’s East Teaching Institutes, 32,611,380 won, 250,94,980 won, 257,382,100 won, 116,343,270 won, 137,030 won, 119,157,380 won, 133,654,47,470 won, and 117,92,400 won, 117,94,400 won, 13,654, and 380 won, 13,654, and 380 won, 117,92, and 400 won, in relation to the Plaintiff’s private teaching institutes, shall be revoked.

Reasons

1. Details of the disposition;

A. The Plaintiff’s East Young School Foundation (hereinafter referred to as the “Plaintiff’s East Young School”) established and operated the Dong Young High School, the Dong Young Young High School, the information industry high school for the children, the Plaintiff’s school foundation (hereinafter referred to as the “Plaintiff’s Young Young School”), the Seoul Young Young School, the Seoul Young Young Young School, and the Mine Young High School for the Plaintiff’s Educational Foundation (hereinafter referred to as the “Plaintiff’s Mine Young School”), the Mine Young High School, and the Young Young High School for the Plaintiff’s Educational Foundation (hereinafter referred to as the “Plaintiff Young Young School”), the Young Young High School, the Plaintiff’s Educational Foundation, the Ha Young High School for the Plaintiff’s Educational Foundation (hereinafter referred to as the “Plaintiff Young High School”), and the Plaintiff’s Educational Foundation, the Busan High School for the Plaintiff’s Educational Foundation (hereinafter referred to as the “Plaintiff Samsan High School”), and the school foundation for the Plaintiff’s Educational Foundation (hereinafter referred to as the “Plaintiff Samsan High School”) established and operated the school foundation for the Plaintiff’s children.

B. On July 1, 2010, on which Nonparty 12 was appointed as the chief director, Nonparty 8, the spouse of Nonparty 12, was appointed as the principal of the Dong-Jon High School and the Dong-Jon High School for Women’s Information Industry. The Plaintiff Mine High School appointed Nonparty 14, the spouse of Nonparty 13, as the chief director from September 1, 2007 to February 29, 2008, and the principal of the Gwangju High School for Children’s Employment on March 1, 2008, and the principal of the Dong-Jon High School for Children’s Employment on March 1, 2008, on which Nonparty 11 was on duty as the chief director, Nonparty 11 appointed Nonparty 9, the children of Nonparty 11, the Yon High School for Children’s Employment on March 11, 208, and Nonparty 16, the Y on May 10, 2008.

On the other hand, on March 1, 2007, the Plaintiff Young-gu appointed Nonparty 1 as the principal of the Seoul Female Commercial High School, and Nonparty 6, the spouse of Nonparty 1, was appointed as the principal on August 24, 2007. On March 1, 2008, the Plaintiff Young-gu appointed Nonparty 2 as the principal of the Young-gu High School, and Nonparty 7, the principal of Nonparty 2, the head of Nonparty 2, was appointed as the principal on November 3, 2008. On October 2, 2008, the Plaintiff Young-gu Private School appointed Nonparty 3 as the principal of the Gangwon High School, and on November 2, 2008, Nonparty 5, the father of Nonparty 3, the principal of the school, Nonparty 1, Nonparty 14, Nonparty 9, Nonparty 4, Nonparty 15, and Nonparty 2, respectively, referred to as the “Nonindicted 3, and Nonparty 8,” respectively.

C. After appointing the principal of each of the instant schools, the Plaintiffs reported to the Defendant the appointment of each of the above principal pursuant to Article 54(1) of the Private School Act.

D. On December 15, 2010, the Defendant notified the Plaintiffs to return each of the financial defective subsidies stated in the purport of the claim during the period of non-approval service pursuant to Article 9(2) of the Seoul Special Metropolitan City Ordinance on the Financial Support for Private Schools (hereinafter “each of the instant ordinances”) on the ground that the Plaintiffs appointed the principal of each of the instant schools established and operated by the Plaintiffs as the principal of each of the instant schools without obtaining approval from the Defendant who is the competent agency of the relationship between the president, the spouse, or the lineal descendants of each school juristic person and the spouse (hereinafter “spouse, etc.”).

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence 1 to 8, Gap evidence 3, Eul evidence 4-1 to 4, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. The plaintiffs' assertion

Each disposition of this case is unlawful for the following reasons.

① Although the Plaintiffs did not obtain the Defendant’s approval from the competent authority while appointing Nonparty 8, etc. who are related to the chief director, spouse, etc. of each school foundation as the principal of each school, this does not constitute grounds for the Defendant’s return of subsidies under Article 9(2) of the instant Ordinance, which is the grounds for each disposition of this case, and thus, the instant disposition

② Under Article 54(1) of the Private School Act and Article 23(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Private School Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 21274, Jan. 28, 2009), when the Defendant received an appointment report from the Plaintiffs on the non-party 8, etc. from the head of the relevant private school under the following conditions: (a) the form of report on appointment and dismissal of private school teachers attached with personnel records cards, copies of the minutes of the board of directors’ meeting; (b) Article 54(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Private School Act; and (c) Article 23 of the Enforcement Decree of the Seoul Office of Education’s notification of the Seoul Office of Education (amended by the Seoul Office of Education No. 2010-17, Nov. 17, 2010; and (c) Article 54-3(3) of the Private School Act should be added to a person who was appointed by the head of the relevant private school through the recommendation or approval procedure of the head of the relevant private school.

On the other hand, in the case of the plaintiff Young-gu Private Teaching Institutes, Young-gu Private Teaching Institutes, and Song Young-gu Private Teaching Institutes, the non-party 1, the non-party 2, and the non-party 3, who are the principals, have been appointed as the president of each of the above plaintiffs. The proviso of Article 54-3 (3) of the Private School Act cannot be interpreted that the appointment of the principal should be approved by the competent authorities until the person who is in a relationship with the principal and his spouse, etc. is appointed as the president later. Even if not, the plaintiff Young-gu Private Teaching Institutes, the non-party 2, and the non-party 5, who are the principals, have been appointed as the principal of the school after being appointed as the principal, shall not be interpreted to have been appointed as the principal. Even if not, the

Therefore, each of the dispositions of this case based on the premise that the plaintiffs appointed Nonparty 8, etc. as the principal without the approval of the competent authorities is unlawful.

③ Even if the Defendant cannot be deemed to have accepted the report of the appointment of the principal of the Plaintiffs, it cannot be deemed that there was an approval of the competent agency. However, the Plaintiffs were bound that the Defendant accepted the report of the appointment of the principal of the Plaintiffs (the appointment approval of the principal in the case of the Plaintiff, the Young-gu Private Teaching Institute, and the Song private Teaching Institute) as it was, and did not make any recommendation or corrective measures regarding the procedure for approving the appointment of the principal, and there was no choice but to trust that the Defendant had obtained the approval of the appointment of the competent agency pursuant to Article 54-3(3) of the Private School Act. In addition, the Plaintiffs did not have known that Nonparty 8, etc. should obtain the approval of the competent agency under Article 54-3(3) of the Private School Act at the time of reporting the appointment of the principal of the school. The Defendant did not accept the Plaintiffs’ appointment approval of the principal of the school in light of the following: (a) it was clear that the Defendant had not received any recommendation or corrective measures to revoke the appointment of the principal, etc.

④ The Defendant, upon each disposition of the instant case, intended to return the financial defective subsidy to the corporate accounting funds, not the Plaintiffs’ funds for the school accounting. However, since the Defendant initially paid the financial defective subsidy to the school accounting, such return should also be made with the school accounting funds, not corporate accounting funds. Therefore, the refund of the financial defective subsidy should be enforced only when surplus has been left in the school accounting, but each disposition of the instant case is unlawful.

B. Relevant statutes

The entries in the attached Table-related statutes are as follows.

C. Determination

1) Determination on the first assertion (the assertion that there is no legal basis for each of the dispositions in this case)

Article 43(1) of the Private School Act provides that the State or a local government may grant subsidies to a school juristic person which has applied for subsidies under the conditions as prescribed by the Municipal Ordinance of the local government concerned for the purpose of supporting private school education, and Article 9(1) of the Ordinance provides that a school juristic person shall not use subsidies determined and notified by the Superintendent of the Provincial Office of Education for the purpose other than the purpose of support. Article 9(2) of the Ordinance provides that when an institution subject to support uses subsidies for the purpose other than the purpose of support (Article 1); when a false fact is discovered (Article 6); when an application for subsidies and various reports prescribed by the Ordinance of this case are provided (Article 7) or when a person receives subsidies by other improper means (Article 54-3(3) of the Private School Act, the head of the school juristic person and a person who has any of the following relations may not be appointed to the head of the school established and operated by the school juristic person concerned; however, the same shall not apply to a person who has obtained approval from at least 2/3 of the fixed number of directors and the spouse subparagraph 1.

With respect to this case, the facts that the plaintiffs appointed the principal of each of the schools of this case in which the plaintiffs established and managed the principal of each school of this case and the non-party 8, whose spouse is the non-party 8, etc. who is the principal of each school of this case (the fact that the appointment of each principal was not approved by the competent authorities after the appointment of each principal) do not conflict between the parties, and thus the appointment of the principal for the non-party 8, etc. of the plaintiffs is invalid. Nevertheless, since the plaintiffs did not obtain the status as the principal of the school, the non-party 8, etc. included the non-party 8, etc. who did not obtain the status as the principal of the school of this case in each of the school of this case, and applied for a financial defective subsidy and received it, the payment of the financial defective subsidy paid to the non-party 8, etc. constitutes "when false facts were discovered in the application for the subsidy by unjust means" or

Therefore, this part of the plaintiffs' assertion on the grounds that there is no legal basis for each of the dispositions of this case is without merit.

2) Determination on the second argument (the proposal, etc. for the appointment approval of the head of a school)

The provisions of the main sentence of Article 54-3 (3) of the Private School Act, by excluding, in principle, appointment of those who have certain personal relations, such as the president and the spouse of a school juristic person to the principal of a school operated by the school juristic person, aims to promote the sound development of a private school by preventing school from operating the school centered on relatives of the president and relatives of the school, separating the school management from the school juristic person and realizing transparent school management. The provisions of the proviso of Article 54-3 (3) of the Private School Act exceptionally relaxs excessive restriction on fundamental rights for the freedom of occupation, the right to pursue happiness, etc. of the president and relatives of the school by allowing those who have certain personal relations, such as the president and the spouse, to be appointed to the principal of the school after obtaining approval from the competent agency through the consent

In light of the above legislative intent, “approval by the competent authorities” with respect to the appointment of the principal required by the proviso of Article 54-3(3) of the Private School Act is a kind of exercise of management and supervision rights to enhance transparency and public nature in operating exceptional private schools by relatives and relatives of the president. Thus, if the appointment and dismissal of the principal of a school is made within seven days, the meaning of “report on the appointment and dismissal” under Article 54(1) of the Private School Act, which provides that the appointment and dismissal of the principal of a school shall be reported within seven days. Therefore, if the plaintiffs appointed the principal of each school foundation, who is the non-party 8, who is related with the principal of each school foundation, as his spouse, etc., and reported it to the defendant, the defendant cannot be deemed to have obtained the approval from the competent authorities demanding the approval of the competent authorities under the proviso of Article 54-3(3) of the Private School Act, even if the defendant accepted it without recommendation or corrective measures, it cannot be deemed that the appointment and dismissal of the principal of each school at the time when the plaintiffs submitted to the defendant to the defendant.

In addition, there is no ground to conclude that the approval of the competent agency on the appointment of the chief director of the above school foundation (Article 20(2) of the Private School Act) can be deemed as the approval of the competent agency on the appointment of the principal, which is demanded by the proviso of Article 54-3(3) of the Private School Act, as alleged by the Plaintiff Professor Young-gu, Young-gu, and Song Private School.

In addition, in light of the contents of Article 54-3(3) of the Private School Act and the legislative intent thereof, those who are related to the president and spouse of a school juristic person shall not be allowed to hold office as the principal without the approval of the competent agency. This would be the same in the case where those who are related to the principal and his spouse during the Do in which they are appointed and serve as the principal are appointed and appointed later as the president. If it is deemed that the above provision is not applied on the ground that the president and the person who shall be excluded from the appointment of the principal in a certain status relationship with the principal were appointed before the appointment of the president, as alleged by the Plaintiff Professor Young-gu, Young-gu, and Song Private School, the appointment of the principal and

Therefore, if Nonparty 6, Nonparty 7, and Nonparty 5, who were appointed and worked as the principal of the school, were appointed and appointed as the chief of the school (According to the statement No. 4-2 of the evidence No. 5), Nonparty 6 resigned from the chief of the school in order to appoint Nonparty 6’s spouse who was employed as the chief of the board of directors on February 6, 2007 as the principal of the school, but Nonparty 6 was appointed as the chief of the school on August 24, 2007, after Nonparty 1 was appointed as the principal of the school on March 1, 2007, Nonparty 6 again assumed office as the chief of the school on August 24, 2007, Nonparty 6, who was appointed as the principal of the school, and Nonparty 1, Nonparty 2, Nonparty 2, and Nonparty 3’s principal of the school, and Nonparty 5’s appointment of the principal of the school after the appointment of Nonparty 1, Nonparty 2, and Nonparty 3’s appointment of the principal of the school should be lawful.

Meanwhile, according to the evidence Nos. 1 and 2 of the evidence Nos. 9-1 and 2, after the plaintiff was notified by the defendant of the illegal grounds for the appointment of the principal from the defendant, on December 13, 2010, the defendant applied for the approval of appointment from the defendant on December 16, 201, pursuant to the proviso to Article 54-3 (3) of the Private School Act. However, the term of office is from December 16, 2010 to October 1, 2012. In addition, since the appointment of the principal against the non-party 3 of the non-party 5's private teaching institute became null and void due to the appointment of the chief of the non-party 5's office, in light of the contents and legislative intent of Article 54-3 (3) of the Private School Act, the non-party 5 obtained the appointment approval from the defendant, and it cannot be viewed that the appointment of the principal of the plaintiff cannot be legally approved (the appointment of the principal of the plaintiff).

Therefore, all of the plaintiffs' assertion that the appointment of the principal of the non-party 8, etc. is legitimate even without the defendant's approval, or that the appointment of the principal is legitimate, is without merit.

3) Determination on the third argument (in violation of the new rules or the principle of protection of trust)

The written evidence evidence Nos. 5, 7, and 8-1, 23-1, and 2 of the evidence Nos. 1, 23-2 cannot be readily concluded that the Defendant was aware of the fact that each school juristic person was appointed as the principal at the time of reporting the appointment of the principal of each school of the Plaintiffs, including the Plaintiff’s Mine Research Institute. Even if the Defendant could have known that Nonparty 8, etc. had a relation with the principal of each school juristic person by reporting the status of each school juristic person after reporting the appointment of the principal of each school, reporting the status of relationship between the school juristic person and his spouse ( evidence Nos. 4, 5, 12-2, 13-2, and 13-2 of the evidence Nos. 4, 16-1 and 2 of the report on the change of the principal, it cannot be deemed that the Defendant did not obtain any recommendation or corrective measures to obtain any approval to appoint the principal of each school, or not obtain any approval for the appointment of the principal.

In addition, in light of the following circumstances acknowledged by the purport of evidence Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 3 of evidence Nos. 2-1, 2-3 and the entire purport of arguments and arguments, namely, in case that the defendant notifies the school foundation including the plaintiffs as the principal in several times that he should obtain approval from the competent agency pursuant to the proviso of Article 54-3 (3) of the Private School Act if he appoints the chairman's lineal descendants, etc. as the principal, it is difficult to conclude that the plaintiffs' failure to know the above provision and failure to obtain approval from the competent agency, and there is no evidence to conclude that the above application would have been naturally accepted if the plaintiffs applied for approval from the principal at the time

Therefore, each of the dispositions in this case by the defendant on the ground that the competent authorities did not approve the appointment of the principal of Nonparty 8, etc. cannot be deemed to violate the principle of good faith or the principle of protecting trust. Therefore, this part of the plaintiffs' assertion

4) Determination on the fourth argument (the argument that subsidies should be returned in school accounting)

Article 29(1) of the Private School Act provides that the accounts of a school juristic person shall be divided into the accounts of the school juristic person and the accounts of the school juristic person in order to prevent illegal diversion by the school juristic person’s managers. Article 29(1) of the Private School Act provides that the accounts of the school juristic person shall be divided into the accounts of the school juristic person established and operated by the school juristic person and the accounts of the juristic person. In spite of the division and operation of the above accounts, the school juristic person shall belong to the legal relations related to the school juristic person. According to Article 3 of the Ordinance of this case, the subject of the payment of the financial defective subsidy shall be referred to as “school juristic person or private school manager”. Thus, in order to efficiently provide and manage the financial defective subsidy, the Defendant

Therefore, this part of the plaintiffs' assertion on different premise is without merit.

3. Conclusion

The plaintiffs' claims are dismissed in entirety because they are without merit.

[Attachment Omission of Related Acts]

Judges Cho Il-young (Presiding Judge) Kim Jong-san Kim Tae