In addition, all appeals filed by the respondent for attachment order and the prosecutor are dismissed.

A. Defendant and the person who requested the attachment order (hereinafter “Defendant”) had a mental and physical disorder and the person who requested the attachment order (hereinafter “Defendant”) had the ability to discern things or make decisions by drinking while committing the instant crime.

2) The punishment sentenced by the lower court to the Defendant (two years and six months of imprisonment, and forty hours of completion of sexual assault treatment programs) is too unreasonable.

B. Prosecutor 1) The above-mentioned sentence that the court below's improper sentencing was committed against the defendant is too uneasible and unfair.

2) Since the exemption from disclosure or notification order is likely to pose a high risk of repeating a crime, it is unreasonable for the lower court to exempt the Defendant from disclosure or notification order of personal information.

3) The lower court’s dismissal of the Defendant’s request for the attachment order of this case, despite the risk of recommitting a sexual crime, is unreasonable.

2. Determination

A. According to the records of the judgment on the Defendant’s mental and physical assertion, the part of the instant case was somewhat drunk at the time of committing the instant crime.

I seem to appear.

However, in light of the motive, means, and method of the instant crime, etc., the victim stated in the investigative agency that “the Defendant was able to ask the victim about the way at the time of the instant crime, and stop and stop the instant crime,” and the motive, method, etc. of the instant crime, it is not deemed that the Defendant lacks the ability to discern things or make decisions due to drinking at the time of the instant crime.

Therefore, the defendant's mental and physical weak argument is without merit.

2) We examine both the Defendant and the Prosecutor’s respective arguments regarding unfair sentencing.

If there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the first trial, and the first trial sentencing does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion.