2. In our Criminal Procedure Act, which takes the principle of court-oriented trials and the principle of direct determination, there are unique areas of the court of first instance regarding the determination of sentencing, and in light of the ex post facto and aesthetic nature of the appellate court, it is reasonable to respect the determination of sentencing in cases where there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the court of first instance, and the sentencing of the court of first instance does not deviate from the reasonable scope of the discretion. It is desirable to reverse the judgment of the court of first instance solely on the ground that the sentencing of the court of first instance falls within the reasonable scope of the discretion, but is somewhat different from

(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015). In accordance with the foregoing legal doctrine, there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the lower court’s failure to submit new sentencing data in the examination room and the trial room. In full view of all of the reasons for sentencing as indicated in the records and arguments of this case, the lower court is not deemed to have exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion, such as that punishment is too light.

3. In conclusion, the prosecutor's appeal is dismissed in accordance with Article 364 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act. It is so decided as per Disposition.