2. Determination

A. The sentencing is based on the statutory penalty, and the discretionary determination is made within a reasonable and reasonable scope, taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing as prescribed in Article 51 of the Criminal Act.

However, considering the unique area of sentencing of the first instance court that is respected under the principle of trial priority and the principle of directness taken by our Criminal Procedure Act and the nature of the ex post facto review of the appellate court, it is reasonable to reverse the unfair judgment of the first instance court only in cases where it is deemed that the judgment of the first instance court exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion when comprehensively considering the conditions of sentencing as shown in the process of the first instance sentencing hearing and the sentencing criteria, or where it is deemed unfair to maintain the first instance sentencing as it is in full view of the materials newly discovered in the course of the appellate court’s sentencing hearing.

In the absence of such exceptional circumstances, it is desirable to respect the sentencing of the first instance court in the absence of such exceptional circumstances.

(see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). (B)

Examining in light of the above legal principles, the grounds for unfair sentencing alleged by the prosecutor appear to be the circumstances that the lower court had already taken into account in determining the punishment, and considering the overall circumstances related to the sentencing of this case, the lower court’s sentencing was made within the reasonable scope of discretion, and it is reasonable to respect this.

Therefore, the prosecutor's assertion of unfair sentencing is without merit.

3. The prosecutor's appeal of conclusion is without merit, and it is dismissed in accordance with Article 364 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act.