교통사고처리특례법위반(치상)등
The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.
1. The main point of the grounds for appeal is that the lower court’s punishment (7 million won in penalty) is too unhued and unreasonable.
2. It is reasonable to respect the sentencing conditions compared to the first instance court where there is no change in the sentencing conditions, and the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). The lower court determined the Defendant’s punishment in consideration of (i) the Defendant’s unfavorable circumstances; (ii) the Defendant considered that the blood alcohol concentration was high; and (iii) the victim was injured; (iv) the Defendant is against the Defendant in favorable circumstances; (iv) the vehicle would be likely to be able to compensate for damage due to the purchase of an automobile comprehensive insurance policy; and (v) the primary offender was the first offender.
As above, the sentencing of the lower court appears to have been conducted within the reasonable scope of discretion by fully taking into account the above conditions of the sentencing, and there is no change in the sentencing condition that can be deemed unfair to maintain the sentencing of the lower court as it is. Therefore, it is difficult to view that the lower court’s sentencing is unfair because it is too un
Therefore, the prosecutor's above assertion is without merit.
3. In conclusion, the prosecutor’s appeal is dismissed under Article 364(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act on the grounds that it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition (Article 25(1) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure; however, in accordance with Article 25(1) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the “report on the circumstantial statement of the main window” in the summary of the evidence as stated in Article 3 of the judgment below shall be deemed to be “report on the circumstantial statement of the main driver”; “the pertinent legal provision on the facts constituting the crime of 1.” in the application of the Act, “Article 148-2(2)3 and Article 44(1) of the Road Traffic Act” shall be deemed to be “Article 148-2(2)2 and Article 44(1) of the Road Traffic Act (the act of drinking alcohol).”