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(영문) 부산지방법원 2019.03.27 2018나56886

구상금

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1. The part of the judgment of the court of first instance against the plaintiff, which orders payment below, shall be revoked.

The defendant.

Reasons

1. Facts of recognition;

A. The Plaintiff is an insurer who has entered into an automobile insurance contract with C (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) and the Defendant is an insurer who has entered into an automobile insurance contract with D vehicle (hereinafter “Defendant”).

B. On April 14, 2018, at around 13:20 on April 14, 2018, the Defendant’s vehicle turned off a broom as shown in the separate sheet, such as the summary of the accident indicated in the separate sheet, which led to the shock of the right edge of the expressway, and proceeded on the one-lane side of the central separation zone. On the other hand, the front part of the Plaintiff’s vehicle driven along the one-lane was shocked by the front part of the driver’s seat of the Defendant vehicle.

(hereinafter referred to as “instant accident”). C.

The Plaintiff paid insurance money of KRW 19,510,000 in total until April 30, 2018 with the repair cost of the Plaintiff’s vehicle destroyed.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence 1 to 8, Eul evidence 1 to 4, and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Determination on the cause of the claim

A. The plaintiff asserts that the accident in this case occurred due to the whole negligence of the defendant's vehicle, which continued from the four-lanes on the highway to be broomd up to the one-lanes. 2) At the time of the accident, the defendant asserts that since the driver of the plaintiff's vehicle at the time of the accident in this case was negligent in neglecting the speed from the broom, the plaintiff's negligence ratio corresponding to this is more than 50%.

B. Determination 1) Generally, as a driver of an automobile driving on an expressway for exclusive use by motor vehicles, it is not foreseeable that an obstacle on the expressway would appear in the case of ordinary circumstances. Thus, barring any circumstances that could anticipate a concrete danger, it cannot be said that the driver has a duty of care to reduce the speed in operating an automobile on the expressway (see Supreme Court Decision 71Do623, May 24, 1971).