1. As to the assertion regarding the Guarantee of Workers' Retirement Benefits Act (hereinafter "Retirement Benefits Act"),

A. The purpose of the Retirement Benefits Act is to contribute to the stable livelihood security of workers by prescribing matters necessary for the establishment and operation of the retirement benefit scheme (Article 1). The term “worker” under the above Act refers to a worker under Article 2(1)1 of the Labor Standards Act (Article 2 Subparag. 1). The term “benefit” under the above Act refers to a retirement benefit scheme or a pension or a lump-sum payment paid to an employee under an individual retirement pension plan under Article 25 (Article 2 Subparag. 5). Therefore, in light of the legislative intent of the Act and the language and text of each provision, Article 7(1) of the Retirement Benefits Act that provides that “the right to receive benefits under the retirement benefits plan shall not be transferred or provided as a security” applies only to an employee under Article 2(1)1 of the Labor Standards Act, and does not apply to the representative director of a corporation that does not constitute a worker under the Labor Standards Act.

B. The lower court rejected the Plaintiff’s assertion that the instant retirement pension was null and void as it violates Article 7(1) of the Retirement Benefits Act, on the ground that the Plaintiff had been a representative director who was working for the Nonparty SB Co., Ltd. (former Before the change: hereinafter “the instant retirement pension”), and applied for payment of the instant retirement pension in lump sum to the Defendant after retirement from the Nonparty Company. The Defendant, on the ground that the Plaintiff jointly and severally guaranteed the Plaintiff’s loan obligation, set off the Plaintiff’s claim against the Plaintiff as an automatic claim and paid only the remainder of the money by setting off the amount equivalent to a half of the said retirement pension (hereinafter “instant offset”) on the ground that the Plaintiff jointly and severally guaranteed the Plaintiff’s loan obligation.

C. Examining the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine on Article 7(1) of the Retirement Benefits Act or by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal.

2. As to the allegation regarding offset

The court below rejected the plaintiff's assertion that the offset of this case is null and void, on the ground that the offset of this case against the defendant is valid since the retirement pension claim of this case was embodied and the payment date of the retirement pension claim of this case against the defendant after the plaintiff retired from the non-party company and the defendant applied for the payment of the retirement pension of this case in lump sum.

In light of the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the nature of retirement pension claims, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal.

3. As to the assertion regarding the violation of the principle of normy, the principle of good faith, and the employer’s liability

The plaintiff asserts that the head of the branch office, etc. of the defendant set off the retirement pension of this case against the plaintiff, even though it is confirmed that the retirement pension of this case is not subject to seizure. Thus, the set-off of this case is null and void in violation of the principle of prohibition and good faith, and even if it is not so, the defendant is the employer as the head of the branch office, etc., and is liable to compensate the plaintiff for damages

Such assertion in the grounds of appeal is a question of the selection of evidence and fact-finding, which are the matters of fact-finding authority of the fact-finding court, or is based on facts different from the facts recognized by the court below, and cannot

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Ki-taik (Presiding Justice)