A. The crime of attempted breach of trust, which is not included in the crime under Article 3 (1) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes, is not included in the attempted crime, and is defined as the "acquisition of the amount of profit," and thus, the crime of attempted breach of trust which has not actually acquired the amount of profit is not included in the part of the crime of violation of the Aggravated Punishment,

The lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the number of crimes, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment.

B. The lower court’s sentence of unreasonable sentencing (two years and six months of imprisonment, and four years of suspended execution) is too uneasible and unfair.

2. Determination

A. 1) The judgment of the court below on the assertion of the misapprehension of the legal principle is that the breach of trust due to the issuance of each bill on the annexed list of crimes in the court below shall be deemed to constitute a crime of violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes (Misappropriation of trust) by comprehensively covering all a series of acts continuously conducted with respect to the same damage legal interests for a certain period of time as a single criminal intent, and that some of those crimes (No. 20 or no. 40 No. 20 or no. 40 of the above crime list) were committed, but only some of these crimes were committed, and it cannot be deemed to constitute an attempted crime of breach of trust under the Criminal Act, which is in the relation of the violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes (Misappropriation of Trust). 2) Even if multiple acts of breach of trust

(See Supreme Court Decision 2007Do541 Decided July 23, 2009). The Defendant violated his/her duty as a director or an actual operator of a victim C Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “victim Co., Ltd.”), thereby paying the price for the goods of D Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “D”) that he/she operated separately as a representative director.