[2] The meaning of "the purport of the judgment of the court below" under Article 30 (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act where the judgment of the court below becomes final and conclusive on the grounds that the judgment of the court below was unlawful but that the conclusion is just

[2] The reasoning of the judgment of the court below is unlawful but the judgment of the court below is just and the judgment of the court below becomes final and conclusive, "the purport of the judgment" as stipulated in Article 30 (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act refers to the reasoning of the judgment of the court of final appeal and the conclusion

After compiling the adopted evidence, the court below acknowledged the facts as stated in its reasoning, and determined that the examination procedure conducted to determine whether to appoint Defendants 3, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 28, and 30 by the Mayor of Incheon Metropolitan City and the Mayor of Incheon junior college, followed the appointment procedure prescribed in the relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, and that the examination procedure applied in the relevant examination procedure is reasonable and fair, and thus, the above disposition was conducted to assess the qualifications, service performance, and other capabilities of the above Defendants as university teachers. Thus, even if the above disposition was conducted after August 31, 1998, the court below determined that the above disposition constitutes an indirect compulsory execution of the above final and conclusive judgment against Defendants 3, 20, 36, 200, 36, 36, 27, and 30.

In light of the relevant statutes and the records, the above fact-finding and judgment of the court below are justified, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to any mistake of facts due to violation of the rules of evidence or any disposition in accordance with the purport of the final judgment of this case, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

2. As to the grounds of appeal by 32 Defendants 2 and 32 (excluding Defendants 1 and 25)

A. Under Article 34 of the Administrative Litigation Act, compensation based on the decision of indirect compulsory performance as provided in Article 34 of the Administrative Litigation Act is to secure the administrative agency which has made the disposition secure the performance of the obligation to re-disposition in accordance with the purport of the final and conclusive judgment where the judgment of revocation of rejection becomes final and conclusive. In light of the following: (a) the uncertainty of the content of the obligation to re-disposition in accordance with the purport of the final and conclusive judgment and the possibility of an increase in compensation due to the lapse of the time limit for re-disposition in the decision of indirect compulsory performance; and (b) there is a risk that the administrative agency may compel the administrative agency to accept the disposition and deprive the administrative agency of its discretionary power; and (c) it shall be deemed that it is not a sanction or compensation for delay in re-disposition in accordance with the purport of the final and conclusive judgment; and (d) barring any special circumstance, it is reasonable to deem that it is unnecessary to collect compensation no longer permissible for the other party to the disposition to collect it by collecting compensation,

B. In the same purport, the court below received the plaintiff's claim seeking the exclusion of the executory power of the indirect compulsory performance decision of this case from February 11 of the same year, which is the day following the deadline for the re-disposition as stipulated in the indirect compulsory performance decision of this case, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the nature of compensation based on the indirect compulsory performance decision of Article 34 of the Administrative Litigation Act, contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal.

3. As to Defendant 1’s ground of appeal

In full view of the adopted evidence, the court below rejected the above defendant's assertion that the above defendant was subject to the order of indirect compulsory enforcement on December 24, 1997, and submitted a written waiver of appointment on the ground that he had worked at another university in the examination procedure for appointment as of February 9, 1998, and that in all circumstances, the above defendant voluntarily renounced his right to receive "disposition in accordance with the purport of the judgment ordered by the order of indirect compulsory enforcement" as of February 9, 198, and on the ground that the plaintiff has a benefit to seek the exclusion of compulsory execution based on the order of indirect compulsory enforcement, as long as the above defendant clearly expresses that he had no intention to enforce by the decision of indirect compulsory enforcement.

In light of the records, the above recognition and determination by the court below is just and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the interest in the lawsuit, contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal.

4. As to Defendant 25’s ground of appeal

According to the records, the Seoul High Court Decision 94Gu23564 delivered on January 25, 1996, which was filed by the above defendant, had a right to demand the above defendant to appoint a public school teacher in a case where the founder is changed from a private university to a public university, and the appointing authority has a right to demand the above defendant to appoint the above defendant as a teacher in a public school. Thus, the above defendant's refusal to appoint the above defendant is unlawful. However, the final judgment of this case, which is the appellate court, is the final judgment of this case, is terminated as a matter of course due to the change of the founder. Thus, the above defendant has a right to demand the appointment of a teacher as a teacher in a private university. However, the above defendant has a right to request the appointment of a teacher in a private university as a matter of course, but the above defendant has no right to request the appointment of the founder, and the decision of the lower court that the above defendant's appointment authority did not determine the appointment of the above defendant in accordance with objective and reasonable criteria under the relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, and it is justified.

In the same purport, the court below is just in holding that the appointment authority as the appointment authority shall make a new decision on the above defendant's appointment in accordance with objective and reasonable criteria in accordance with the appointment requirements and procedures prescribed by relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to "the purport of the judgment" under Article 30 (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

5. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Jae- Jae (Presiding Justice)