[2] Where the Mayor rejected a report on the selection and crushing of aggregate on the land determined and publicly notified as an interim construction waste disposal facility, the case holding that the measure of failing to accept a report on the selection and crushing of aggregate is lawful after examining the grounds prescribed by the Act on Special Measures for Designation and Management of Development Restriction Zones and the National Land Planning and Utilization Act

[3] In order for a person who has registered an aggregate extraction business to actually extract aggregate, it shall obtain permission from the competent authority, and whether a separate report should be made to the competent authority in order to screen, clean, or crush aggregate exceeding a certain size (affirmative)

1. As to the legal nature of a report on the screening, washing, or crushing of aggregate

Article 32(1) of the former Aggregate Extraction Act (amended by Act No. 8479 of May 17, 2007; hereinafter the same shall apply) provides that “Any person who intends to screen, clean, or crush aggregate exceeding the scale prescribed by Presidential Decree” shall report to the head of the competent Si/Gun/Gu under the conditions as prescribed by the Ordinance of the Ministry of Construction and Transportation.” As the Aggregate Extraction Act enacted by Act No. 4428 of December 14, 191, all of the duties of screening, washing, crushing, or extraction of aggregate are subject to permission, but the Aggregate Extraction Act was amended by Act No. 5966 of April 15, 199, and thus, it is likely that the duty of screening, washing, or crushing of aggregate exceeding 1,00 cubic meters is subject to reporting, and if so, the duty of screening, crushing or crushing of aggregate may still be deemed to have been changed from the category of application for permission for aggregate extraction to the extent that it is likely to cause harm to the public interest.”

According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the records, the land of this case was determined and publicly announced as urban planning facilities (construction waste interim disposal facilities) on March 10, 2001, and the plaintiff filed a report on the selection and crushing of aggregate under Article 32 (1) of the Aggregate Extraction Act on February 2, 2006 on the land of this case, and the defendant rejected the report on the ground that "it is impossible to process the report within a development-restricted area, and construction or structure of a building (a building for screening and crushing of aggregate) which is not urban planning facilities cannot be installed in duplicate in an interim disposal facility for construction waste determined as urban planning facilities."

In light of the aforementioned legal principles and facts, the Defendant’s failure to accept the report on selection and crushing of the aggregate of this case after examining the grounds prescribed by the Act on Special Measures for Designation and Management of Development Restriction Zones and the National Land Planning and Utilization Act.

The judgment of the court below to the same purport is just, and there is no error of law such as misunderstanding of legal principles, and the Supreme Court decision cited in the ground of appeal is inappropriate to be invoked as it is, contrary to this case.

2. As to the assertion that the person who registered the aggregate extraction business need not report separately

Article 14 (1) 2 of the Addenda to the Aggregate Extraction Act (amended by Act No. 4428 of Dec. 14, 1991) provides that "any person who runs the aggregate extraction business at the time this Act enters into force may run the aggregate extraction business, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 14, until two years after the enforcement date of this Act." Meanwhile, Article 2 (1) 2 of the former Aggregate Extraction Act provides that "the term "the aggregate extraction business" means the business of collecting, screening, washing, or crushing aggregate for profit-making purposes. Article 14 (1) of the same Act provides that the registration of the aggregate extraction business shall be made; Article 22 (1) of the same Act provides that the report on the selection, washing, etc. of aggregate; Article 32 (1) of the same Act provides that "the person who is engaged in the aggregate extraction business at the time of the enactment of the Aggregate Extraction Act shall obtain separate permission from the competent authority; and the person who is registered as the aggregate extraction business under the Aggregate Extraction Act shall report the extraction business separately.

In the same purport, the court below rejected the plaintiff's assertion that there is no need to report on the selection and crushing of aggregate, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

3. As to the assertion that the National Land Planning and Utilization Act does not violate

According to the evidence duly examined by the court below and the court below's decision that the construction of structures for selecting and crushing aggregate on the land of this case determined and publicly announced as urban planning facilities (construction waste interim disposal facilities) in the development restriction zone cannot be permitted in violation of Article 11 (1) of the Act on Special Measures for Designation and Management of Development Restriction Zones and Article 64 (1) of the National Land Planning and Utilization Act, is just and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as asserted in the grounds for

4. As to the assertion of violation of the principle of trust protection

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the records, it is just to maintain the judgment of the court of first instance that rejected the plaintiff's assertion that the disposition of this case violates the principle of trust protection, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the principle of trust protection, the principle of proportionality, and abuse of rights, etc

5. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Park Si-hwan (Presiding Justice)