On the other hand, the Defendant did not drive his car on the day of the instant case, and had a driver of a street acting on behalf of the Defendant (referring to a person who renders a substitute driver with money by doing a passenger act in a densely-populated street) drive on behalf of the Defendant on behalf of the driver, and argued that the above substitute driver caused a traffic accident and the Defendant left the scene or at the space between the Defendant, but it is difficult to believe it as it is in light of the circumstances of the traffic accident and the situation at the time of control. The Defendant’s statement consistent with the above assertion is not concrete in relation to the article of the substitute driver’s license operated on behalf of the Defendant, or is inconsistent with the Defendant’s statement.

Comprehensively taking account of the above circumstances, the lower court erred by misapprehending the fact that the Defendant had driven alcohol as stated in the instant facts charged, and thus, the lower court determined otherwise.

2. Determination

A. The lower court’s judgment held that the Defendant’s statement was made in a particularly reliable state pursuant to Article 316(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, in light of the following circumstances acknowledged by each evidence as indicated in the lower judgment, namely, ① the Defendant’s investigation of the police immediately after the instant traffic accident, and stated to the effect that the Defendant made a confession of the driving under influence of alcohol to F by the police officer. However, considering the Defendant’s degree of drinking at the time, the details of the Defendant’s statement on