2. The judgment of the Defendant committed the instant crime, even though he/she had the ability to punish twice as a result of the crime of drunk driving.

On the other hand, the defendant shows his attitude to recognize and reflect his crime.

The defendant has no other penalty power than the above punishment power.

The crime of this case is deemed to be a so-called "nived driving" case where the defendant was aware that the defendant had a drinking alcohol after drinking alcohol at night during the previous night and after drinking alcohol after drinking alcohol, and the degree of recognition of the defendant's crime of drinking alcohol was not clear.

In fact, the defendant's blood alcohol concentration (0.054%) was not high at the time of drunk driving.

The defendant who was punished for a crime of drunk driving before is punished by the crime of this case in 2014 has a considerable interval from the crime of this case.

Comprehensively taking account of the Defendant’s age, character and conduct, environment, motive, means, consequence, and circumstances after the crime, etc., the sentencing of the lower court does not seem to have exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion.

Therefore, the prosecutor's argument of unfair sentencing is not accepted.

3. In conclusion, the prosecutor's appeal is dismissed in accordance with Article 364 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act on the ground that it is without merit.