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(영문) 제주지방법원 2018.06.20 2016나6705

소유권말소등기

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1. Revocation of the first instance judgment.

2. The defendant shall make 3838/778 shares of F forest No. 7,454 square meters in Jeju-si to the plaintiffs.

Reasons

1. The reasoning for the judgment to be explained in this part of the basic facts is the same as the corresponding part of the judgment of the court of first instance, and thus, they are cited in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil

2. The parties' assertion

A. Although the Defendant did not receive a donation from the Deceased for the instant forest, the Defendant is obligated to perform the procedure for the cancellation of the registration of the instant forest transfer to the Plaintiffs, the heir of the Deceased.

B. Around January 7, 1983, the Defendant: (a) donated the forest of this case to the Defendant; (b) confirmed it at the general meeting of January 6, 1994; and (c) the Defendant completed the instant transfer registration in accordance with the Act on Special Measures; (b) thus, the instant transfer registration is valid.

3. Determination

A. Registration completed under the former Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Transfer of Ownership of Real Estate (Act No. 4502, Oct. 27, 2000; hereinafter “Special Measures Act”) is presumed to be a registration consistent with the substantive legal relationship. The presumption of registration of ownership transfer or registration of transfer is not reversed unless it is proved that a letter of guarantee or confirmation prescribed under the Special Measures Act is false or forged, or that it is not legally registered due to any other reason. Here, false letter of guarantee or confirmation refers to a letter of guarantee or confirmation that does not fit the truth of the substantive contents of the reason for the change of rights (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 200Da33775, Oct. 27, 200). The degree of proof of the falsity of a letter of guarantee to reverse the presumption of registration is sufficient to prove that such substantive contents are not true, and it is not sufficient to prove that the judge's conviction is sufficient to the extent that the judge's conviction is not sufficient

(See Supreme Court Decision 9Da39258 delivered on October 12, 2001, and Supreme Court Decision 2005Da21975 delivered on June 24, 2005, etc.) B.

In light of the above legal principles, the health unit, Gap evidence 5, 8, and 9-1, 2, Eul evidence 1, and the witness J, K, and L respectively.