[2] The case affirming the judgment of the court below holding that, in case where the employment contract was concluded between the university faculty Gap and the university faculty Gap whose term of appointment expires at the request of changing the time needed for the change of employment and the two-year term employment contract between them, since it is reasonable to regard the above employment contract as a new form of employment contract with the two-year term employment term employment contract unlike the previous employment contract with the expectation of reappointment as a university faculty member and the previous employment contract with the right to apply for an examination for reappointment, it cannot be deemed as a new form of employment contract with the two-year term employment term term employment contract, upon the fulfillment of the condition of the term of appointment expiration

[3] The validity of the decision to refuse the reappointment of faculty members of private universities who deviate from and abused discretionary power, and the standard for determining whether they deviate from and abused discretionary power

1. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

In cases where a private university teacher who was appointed before the Constitutional Court rendered a ruling of inconsistency with the Constitution as to Article 53-2(3) of the former Private School Act (amended by Act No. 5274 of Jan. 13, 1997) was declared as a ruling of inconsistency with the Constitution as to whether to dismiss his/her reappointment, and then files a lawsuit seeking nullification of the ruling of inconsistency with the Constitution as to the rejection of reappointment, the Private School Act (amended by Act No. 7352 of Jan. 27, 2005) is not applicable retroactively. However, it does not constitute a case where an improvement of the amended Private School Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Revised Private School Act") applies retroactively to the relevant school juristic person, which is an improvement legislation separate from the amended Private School Act, for the purpose of remedy. However, under the Special Act, a private university teacher whose term of appointment has expired after being appointed as a fixed-term teacher, without legitimate examination of its ability and qualities, has no right to request the relevant school juristic person to be reappointed to the extent that it does not conform with the previous standards.

Based on the evidence of employment, the court below accepted the plaintiff's invitation of 1985 as a professor at 1985, and did not employ the plaintiff. The plaintiff explained the purport of the establishment of the Central Medical Institute established as a way to assist the plaintiff's research activities of clinical professors at the time of interview with the plaintiff, and as a result, the plaintiff agreed to the above research institute as an assistant professor on March 1, 1985. The plaintiff was appointed as an assistant professor at the Central Medical Institute on 1985. The plaintiff did not have a condition that the plaintiff would remain more respected than the research professor at 1985. From 1985 to 1991.2, the plaintiff's appointment period of 199 to 196.7 to 199.7, the court below excluded the plaintiff's appointment period from the expiration of the term of appointment as a professor at 19 to 194.77, the defendant did not agree with the plaintiff's previous Special Medical Institute on the expiration of the term of appointment.

Examining the above facts established by the court below in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, it is reasonable to view the instant employment contract as a new form of employment contract concluded by the plaintiff as a temporary faculty member of the fixed-term employment system with the expectation of reappointment and the right to apply for review of reappointment, contrary to the previous employment relationship with which the plaintiff had the right to apply for review of reappointment. Therefore, the judgment of the court below to the same purport is just and there is no error in the misapprehension of

In addition, the ground of appeal on the process of concluding the instant appointment contract is merely a fact-finding court, which is a fact-finding court, disputing the acknowledgement of facts or the preparation of evidence, and thus cannot be deemed a legitimate ground of appeal.

2. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

Where a non-permanent university teacher refuses reappointment in accordance with the criteria for examination of reappointment, i.e., the objective reason for refusal of reappointment, i.e., the lack of any grounds for refusal of reappointment, or even if there exist such grounds, a fair examination based on reasonable criteria is found to lack of discretion in examining eligibility for reappointment by verifying his/her ability and qualities as a teacher, and thus it is reasonable in social norms to deny its judicial effect itself, the decision to refuse reappointment may be deemed null and void. Meanwhile, the decision to refuse reappointment is deemed null and void in cases where the decision to refuse reappointment violates the principle of proportionality or violates the principle of equality by losing balance in light of negative evaluation factors which are considered to be contrary to the principle of public interest or based on the determination of refusal of reappointment without reasonable grounds, and it is necessary to comprehensively determine various factors, such as the content and nature of negative facts and the degree consistent with the criteria for examination of reappointment, depending on a specific case, and the burden of proof is to be borne by a person who asserts the decision to refuse reappointment due to deviation or abuse of discretionary power (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Da9797.).

The court below held that there is no additional evidence that the defendant abused or abused discretion to the extent permitted in the examination of reappointment in relation to the decision to refuse reappointment of this case. In light of the above legal principles and records, the judgment of the court below is acceptable, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to deviation or abuse of discretionary power in relation to the decision to refuse reappointment of this case, as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Ahn Dai-hee (Presiding Justice)