성매매알선등행위의처벌에관한법률위반(성매매알선등)
All appeals by the Defendants are dismissed.
1. Summary of grounds for appeal;
A. In fact-finding (Defendant A) despite the fact-finding that Defendant A is merely an employee of the instant sexual traffic business establishment, but does not constitute an “business owner”, the lower court recognized Defendant A as an “business owner” and sentenced Defendant A to the collection of additional charges.
B. The lower court’s each sentence against the Defendants is too unreasonable on the ground that the Defendants’ respective sentences are too unreasonable.
2. Determination
A. According to the evidence duly admitted and examined by the lower court (Defendant A), Defendant A may recognize the fact that Defendant A was in charge of putting an advertisement of the instant sexual traffic business establishment on the Internet website, and that Defendant A had 30-40% out of the shares of the business establishment and received profits in proportion to its ratio.
In full view of the above facts, the defendant can be sufficiently recognized that he was not an employee of the sexual traffic business establishment of this case, but was a person who has been engaged in the important part of the operation of the business establishment of this case.
Therefore, the decision of the court below that recognized the defendant's joint principal liability and additionally collected the profits acquired by the act of arranging sexual traffic is just, and the defendant's assertion disputing this point is without merit.
B. There are circumstances in which the Defendants again refrain from committing such an offense.
However, the defendants operated a specialized sexual traffic business establishment with a significant scale and the quality of the crime is not good (the same applies to the case where the defendant A's change of the defendant's appeal against the entry of the defendant A as the "business owner" in the column of the original judgment). In particular, the defendant A had already been punished for the same crime and committed another crime despite being under the suspension of execution, and the defendant C continuously committed the crime despite the fact that it had been controlled twice at the same place.