Criminal facts have to be proved to the extent that there is no reasonable doubt (Article 307(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act). However, the preparation of evidence and the probative value of evidence conducted on the premise of fact-finding belong to the free judgment of the fact-finding court (Article 308 of the Criminal Procedure Act). For the reasons stated in its reasoning, the lower court recognized that the first instance judgment, which found the Defendant guilty on the part of the 2016 highest order 7456 case among the criminal facts in the first instance judgment, was justifiable, and rejected the Defendant’s allegation of the grounds for appeal as to this part.

The allegation in the grounds of appeal is the purport of disputing the determination of the lower court on the facts that led to such determination. It is nothing more than denying the lower court’s determination on the selection and probative value of evidence, which belong to the free judgment of the fact-finding court. Furthermore, even if examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the aforementioned legal doctrine and the evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err in its judgment by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence

In addition, in light of the reasoning of the lower judgment’s reasoning that the lower court did not fully consider the circumstances attached to the sentencing, it constitutes an unfair argument for sentencing.

Therefore, under Article 383 subparagraph 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act, only in cases where death penalty, life imprisonment, or imprisonment with or without prison labor for not less than ten years has been imposed, an appeal may be filed on the grounds of unfair sentencing. As such, in this case where a more minor sentence has been imposed against the defendant, the argument that the determination of the sentence of the court below, including the above argument, is unfair, cannot

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.