2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

On February 19, 2014, the Plaintiff filed an application for refugee status with the Defendant on March 18, 2014, when he/she entered and stayed in the Republic of Korea as a tourism visa (B-2) and visa (B-2).

On January 13, 2015, the Defendant rendered a disposition to deny the Plaintiff’s application for refugee status (hereinafter “instant disposition”) on the ground that the Plaintiff’s assertion does not constitute “a well-founded fear that would be subject to persecution” as stipulated in Article 1 of the Refugee Convention and Article 1 of the Refugee Protocol.

The Plaintiff filed an objection with the Minister of Justice on January 29, 2015, but the said objection was dismissed on the same ground as September 24, 2015, and the said dismissal decision was notified to the Plaintiff on December 18, 2015.

【Ground of recognition” without any dispute, the Plaintiff’s assertion as to the legitimacy of the instant disposition, as indicated in Gap’s evidence Nos. 1 through 4, Eul’s evidence Nos. 1 and 2, was assaulted and threatened by the South mentor on the ground that the Plaintiff was the North mentor’s origin, and operated his clothes in the South mentor’s area.

Therefore, the defendant's disposition of this case which did not recognize the plaintiff as a refugee is unlawful even though the possibility that the plaintiff would be stuffed due to the above circumstances is high in the case that the plaintiff returned to mentmen.

Judgment

In addition to the above-mentioned facts, it is insufficient to view that there is a well-founded fear of persecution to the plaintiff in full view of the following circumstances, which can be seen when adding the contents of Gap evidence Nos. 5, 6, Eul evidence No. 3, and 4 and the purport of the whole pleadings. The defendant's disposition of this case is legitimate since there is no other evidence to acknowledge

Plaintiff

Even according to the assertion, the plaintiff was threatened with conflicts with local residents while operating clothes, and retired from his/her office, and there is no reason for the plaintiff to be threatened with local residents even if he/she has already ceased to operate his/her clothes and left the relevant area.

The plaintiff is the last body fighting.