(b) Violation of the National Security Act (association, communication, etc.);

(c) Violation of the National Security Act;

2.(c) B

Law Firm E, Attorney F (for the defendant)

Law Firm G, Attorney H (for the defendant)

Attorney I, J (for the defendant)

1. All facts;

A. Career of the Defendants

(1) Defendant A

Defendant A, from February 2010 to November 2015, visited China at least 29 times, including the long-term stay in China for a month or more from February 2010 to November 2015.

(2) Defendant B

Defendant B, at around 208 and around 2009, performed inter-Korean exchange and cooperation projects by collecting, recycling, or exporting typists, etc. taken out from Korean military units or USF units, and doing so.

B. North Korea’s anti-government organization established the basic goal of the unification of the Korean Peninsula based on Kim Il-sung’s ideology (the so-called “the so-called subject ideology”) by providing that North Korea’s anti-government organization shall build a socialist country in the North part of the Republic of Korea, conduct tasks of the national defense democracy within the scope of the nation, and finally, provide that the society which has already been aimed at carrying out is fully realizing the people’s independence by Kim Il- Il-Seoul, Kim Il-Seoul, and realizes the whole independence of the nation.

In addition, North Korea, according to the so-called ‘Nannam Revolution strategy', has promoted that in order to prevent South Korea's people's awareness as the principal ideology and to realize the unification of the Korean Peninsula, the so-called ‘Military politics' should be developed, which is called ‘military election' that covers all the issues that will be caused by revolutions and construction, and that the people's military forces will keep the whole socialist activities on the ground that they are the columns of the Revolution, and the ‘self-defense power' has been strengthened by strengthening the national defense power by strengthening the national defense power through strengthening the ‘self-defense power' and strengthening the national defense power of the nation through strengthening the national defense power with more power in economic construction and building the socialist country, ‘the construction of a socialist, nuclear force force,' through this construction of the route of North Korea, and achieve the national peace and security of the Korean Peninsula within the scope of self-defense and securing the national defense power of South Korea through the establishment of the political power of South Korea.

As a result, North Korea joined the United Nations on September 17, 1991. On December 13, 1991, North Korea adopted the Framework Agreement between South and North Korea at the so-called high-ranking conference of the Republic of Korea. On June 15, 200 and October 4, 2007, South and North Korea exchange and cooperation are made on various fields of society, such as politics, economy, society, culture, etc. on the 15th of June 199 and June 29, 2002, the 1st of May 27, 2006 and May 27, 2009, the 3rd of the 1st of May 201, 201, the 5th of June 15, 2009, the 1st of March 21, 2010, the 3rd of the 1st of the Korean Peninsula, including the 1st of March 26, 2010.

On the other hand, North Korea, on June 15, 200, and October 4, 2007, has been held two times, and when the South and North Korean Joint Declaration was announced, North Korea, claiming the implementation of the above Declaration, and in front of the term such as "Korean national interest" and "low level federal system", North Korea has continuously instigated the so-called anti-U.S. anti-stateization, anti-Korean democracy, anti-Korean democracy democracy, and anti-Korean unification, such as abolition of the National Security Act, abolition of the federal system, etc.

In order to achieve the above goals, the North Korean Industrial Complex Organization constitutes a variety of organizations for public works in South Korea, such as 225 countries, static General, and the Uniform Electric Cable Register, and detection of national secrets, including national information and military secrets.

Not only is collecting and collecting, but also continuously developing terrorism for major domestic figures, but also is committing criminal acts such as manufacturing, forging, and scambling narcotics by utilizing a dispatched official overseas for the purpose of maintaining the system and raising military funds.

C. An anti-government organization's office of North Korea was established as a 35's office and 35's office of inspection of North Korea's Republic of Korea. On April 1962, the name of the 35's office of inspection of South Korea was expanded to the 35's office of research of North Korea's Republic of Korea around December 1993 and changed to the 35's office of information investigation of North Korea. It was integrated into the 35's office of inspection of North Korea's Republic of Korea through overseas dispatch work of Korea, the collection of major information and data by fields of hostile countries such as the Republic of Korea, the United States, and Japan, the securing of the overseas hub of North Korean workers, and the activities of terrorism and abduction of North Korea. < Amended by Presidential Decree No. 20740, Feb. 2, 2009>

Around February 2009, the "General Bureau of Government Affairs" is a large-scale organization of North Korea, expanded and organized under the jurisdiction of the General Staff group of the military, by integrating the "Operational Department", "C-5 Office", and "Wonam Joint Organization", which is an affiliated organization of the existing Joseon Labor Party, and the "Wonam Joint Organization", which is an affiliated organization of the National People's Department of Government Affairs, and is in charge of the operation of a counter-espionage training training institution, guidance on infiltration and return, operation of land and marine invasion base, operation of military inspection, military inspection, terrorism, kidnapping, kidnapping, abduction, and collection of overseas information, and is also in charge of the trade company's affairs such as public works, funds for military supply, etc.

D. The actual co-authors of 0 in 1995 ( English: P, name Q, R, and first name Sym president) were T lifeed to engage in activities in Thailand under the disguised state’s nationality as a co-author of 35 in Thailand from around 1995 to around 1998, and currently engaged in activities in Thailand’s status as the status of the above co-author in Thailand.

2. Criminal facts;

A. On March 26, 2010, the Defendants’ attempt to provide related meetings and convenience, such as the removal of military equipment and military equipment, etc., were prevented from taking out and bringing in all goods for consignment processing trade as well as general trade between South and North Koreas, and the Korean government took measures against North Korea, such as denying the North Korea from North Korea to North Korea and restricting contact with North Korean residents. Large scale is likely to be used exclusively for military purposes if they are shipped out of North Korea.

Defendant A, from around October 2014 to around October 2014, in exchanging with 0 members of an anti-government organization, was requested by Dongs as to whether he/she could request the drawing for the transition. Meanwhile, even though the Defendants are well aware that the removal of goods from North Korea is prohibited by the above 5.24 measures, and that large-scale transfer of goods can be exclusively used for military purposes, Defendant A had the intent to remove middle typology through 0 to North Korea. Defendant A, on November 13, 2014, notified Defendant B of the e-mail and agreed on the standard, quantity, method, etc. of transfer to North Korea, and accordingly, Defendant B had the following: (a) from around 1, 2014 to around 31, 2015 to around 16, 2014 to October 16, 2014 to supply the e-mail to the Chinese government; and (b) Defendant B had the following conditions: (c) the unit price and quantity of the e-mail supplied to the Chinese government.

On November 25, 2014, Defendant A planned to transfer O and V to North Korean prisoners of war via 'the name of the company' from 'the Republic of Korea to 'the name of the company has been leased', and Defendant B planned to transfer 'the name of the company to 'the name of the company'. On November 29, 2014, Defendant B sent 'the necessary physical quantity' to Kakakao Stockholm to Defendant A's 'the necessary physical quantity' to 'the necessary physical quantity', around 11:40, around 11:40, around 825Ra16, 90Ra20, 100Ra20, 110Ra20, 1020, 'the number of Kao Kao' to 'the Republic of Korea', Defendant A sent to 'the Republic of Korea' to 'the Republic of Korea', 'the Republic of Korea sent to 'the Republic of Korea', 'the Republic of Korea' to 2012.

The Defendants meet with 0 p.m. at the Mandong-si, China around January 9, 2015, and Defendant B 0 only 250 p.m., which is unfolded. Not only a passenger car but also a special sp.m., and handled a lot of military unit sp.m. before May 1, 201. In the military unit, there are many 90 R20, 1100 R.m. in the military unit. On the other hand, it is possible to supply a lot of military truck. It is 90R20, 1100 R. 20 L.m. on the other hand, the number of the Defendants were 0 p.m. at the same time, and 100 M.m., the number of small trucks was 1,000 p.m., and 100 p.m., the number of people in the military can be treated as 00 p.m., more than 200 p.m.

After that, Defendant B, on January 11, 2015, entered the Republic of Korea on January 12, 2015, agreed on the type, quantity, etc. of e-mail to be taken out to North Korea through Defendant A,O, Kakaox, telephone, e-mail, etc. from that time to March 10, 2015, including sending out e-mail containing the content of 650 'China', total sum of (car + large) '18,560', etc.

On the other hand, at around 19:20 on March 18, 2015, Defendant B sent to Defendant B a message stating that “I are responsible for the shipment of vessels to China,” and that “I are responsible for the shipping of vessels to China from X companies (XTD) which are cooperation companies, and for the shipping of vessels to South Korea,” and on April 9, 2015, Defendant B sent to Defendant B a message stating that I are responsible for the shipping of the Republic of Korea to the Republic of Korea. At around 12:12, 2015, Defendant B sent a message stating that I will be responsible for the shipping of the vessel to the Republic of Korea. At around 19:20, 200-R201-R201, 201-R201, 201-R201, 201-R204, 2005-12, 3:00-12, 3:00,000.

In addition, at around 09:00 on May 5, 2015, Defendant A met with 0 at the house of 1106 AA apartment house located in the Dong-dong, China, and Defendant B sent a call to each other. At this time, Defendant B was able to get off a large truck. If possible, the quality of the truck can not be sent up to the latest, because the truck is string off or small, and if it is sent short of renewable, it refers to how the truck was lick, and how it was licked from 0 to 0, and Defendant A entered into a military unit to complete its distribution at the same time as B. It is difficult to say that it is difficult to say that it is difficult to use it in the bid. On the other hand, it is difficult to use it in the bid.

On May 23, 2015, at least 14:00 on May 23, 2015, the Defendants convened with 0 minutes in short-term AB restaurant, and explained Defendant B to 0 on the bidding process on the vehicle in short-term AB restaurant, and the Defendants talked with 0 on the release of the middle string in North Korea, such as talking with the purport that all of the 0s and AB restaurants were prepared to be completed well, and that they would have completed it. Defendant B sent to 201 on May 26, 2015, and Defendant B entered the Republic of Korea on June 15, 2015, and on June 15, 2015, Defendant B sent to 11R 2.2.5 R22.5 container on May 12, 2015 to 200 to 150 on May 25, 201.

As such, on June 16, 2015, Defendant B, who agreed to take out of the country with Defendant A,O, and North Korea, pretended to sell it to X companies (XTD) from K at the port of Busan on June 16, 2015, 1 TEU (1TEU, container number AC) and 263 (1.61, 11.00-20, 20, 9,00-20-20, 12, 14,00-20-208, 10,000Ra20, 2024, 11.00Ra20Ra20, 11.0Ra20, 00Ra20, 11.0Ra20, 00Ra20, 2022.520) were loaded in North Korea, and the ship was released to China through the above paragraph 25, 205.25.6

As such, even if the Defendants conspired to commit an act that may endanger the existence and security of the Republic of Korea or democratic fundamental order, they met on January 9, 2015, May 5, 2015, and May 23, 2015 in order to consult with the members of an anti-government organization or members of an anti-government organization, or 0 persons who received such order, and large-scale military equipment that may be exclusively used for military use, or the collection of related materials, etc., and accordingly, intended to provide money, valuables, or other property benefits, such as large-scale transfer, etc., but failed to achieve such intent.

B. Meetings of Defendant A related to the circulation of USD A and special locked and escape

As described in paragraph (1) above, the Defendant received from around October, 2014 a request from Dongin to exchange with 0 members of anti-government organizations to seek a previous drawing, and even around January, 2015, the Defendant received a request from Dongin to seek the U.S. military equipment or related materials.

On April 18, 2015, the defendant convened with 0 minutes at the house of AAA 1106, located in the Dong-si, China, and requested that he be aware of how he could be able to distribute the above USD 106 from that person, such as "the passage through machinery," and he can not be known when passing through the machinery. The defendant responded to several pages of the sample, 1106, 00, 00, 00,000,000,000,000,000,000,0000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,00,000,000,00,000,00,00,00,00,000,00,000,00,000,00,00,00,00,00.

On April 20, 2015, the Defendant entered the Republic of Korea on April 20, 2015, and sent forged USD 10 ($100) with a photograph affixed thereon and sent it to the telegram. From April 22, 2015 to April 28, 2015, the Defendant sent 0 and eight calls from the AI office operated by Busan-gu AGH from May 1, 2015 to May 1, 2015.

Then, at around 14:00 on the same day after the Defendant left China on May 2, 2015, the following day, at around 14:00, the Defendant received three copies of counterfeited USD 100 ($ 100) which V received from 0, and at around 18:00 on the same day, the Defendant stated that “Neging to V, “Neg,” regardless of whether the inside the inside of the inside of the inside of the inside of the inside of the said day confirmed, or if the inside of the inside of the inside of the said ship, he or she was said to have been said to have been said to have been said to have been said to have been said to have been said to have been said to have been said to have been said to have been said to have been said to have been said to have been said to have been said to have been said to have been said to have been.”

After that, on May 5, 2015, the defendant met 0 at V's house at 0:00 on May 5, 2015, and met with the purport that, as described in paragraph (a) above, 00 and B in connection with the release of the vessel to North Korea, "the U.S. military-related materials were created B," and that, 00, 'if it is possible to exercise the right to vote against forgery from 0', 'if it is possible to exercise the right to vote against forgery', 'in the country', 'in the country' and 'in the country', 'in the country', 'in the country and 'in the country', 'in the country and 'in the country' were made, 'in the country', 'in the country and 'in the country', 'in the country and 'in the country, 'in the country and 'in the country, 'in the country' were detained on 11 December.

As such, the Defendant was issued an order with the purport that he may meet on April 18, 2015, and to inquire about whether he can distribute counterfeited USD from her member of anti-government organization or its branch organization with the knowledge of the fact that it may endanger the existence and security of the State or democratic fundamental order, and escape to China to consult on the accomplishment of its purpose.

Summary of Evidence

1. Each legal statement of a witness V, AJ, K, AL, AM,N, AO, and AP;

1. Recording Record: O (one day, S President), B, and V dialogue: From 15.00 to 15.08, at 0.00, at 200, at 200, at 15:0,000, Chinese one recording book at 25:0,000,000,000,000,000,000,000: 1: 6.0:0,000,000,000,000,000,000: 1: 6.0:0,000,000,000,000,000: 1.0,000,000,000,000: 1.0,000,000,000,000,000: 6.0,000,000,000,000,00

1. The results of analysis based on the execution of a warrant of search and seizure of 14.12.26 E-mail, investigation reports (1.14.1.15.29), investigation reports (15.29) (2) recorded files and photographs from information sources, investigation reports (15.03.19) (2) investigation reports (the results of execution of a warrant of search and seizure), investigation reports (15.03.19 B) (the results of execution of a warrant of search and seizure) (15.19 B), investigation reports (15.19 B, 15.19 B, 15.03.19) (the results of telephone communications reports with North Korea 0, 15.2, 15.4.2, 15.2, 15.2, 15.2, 15.30, 15.30, 15.4, 15.15.

1. Two copies of the seized subscription information, AX response data, seized e-mail data, each transmitted and received e-mail data, output of data, such as photographs, etc. from each transmitted and received, copies of photographs, etc. attached to the above conversation, 12 copies of photographs attached to the above conversation, two copies of the seized e-mail-related documents, four copies of printed out from the e-mail stored in the container, two copies of the seized e-mail-related documents, and one copy of the suspect’s Kakao Stockholm messages confirmed by the suspect B’s mobile phone;

1. Matters with regard to the export of the State of Secondhand fish;

1. Two copies of the certificate of export declaration, two copies of the certificate of import declaration, two copies of the certificate of import declaration, and two copies of the information output of the package imported cargo; and

1. The current status of entry or departure of each individual (Evidence 8);

1. A written appraisal opinion issued by the Korea Exchange Bank, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration reply Form (Equipment specifications team, BA);

1. Determination as to the defendants and their defense counsel's arguments: ‘‘(15.18, China's short-dong, China's short-dong, W, 15.01.08 Chinese short-dong, B, photographed within the vehicle in the 15.01.10 North Korea (one name, one), photographed, R(O), colored, forged, and 100 US dollars photographed within the vehicle in the 15.01.10 North Korea, photographed, submitted by the informant on May 2, 2015, two military typology photographs loaded in the suspect's front gate located in B, two military typology photographs loaded in the suspect's front gate located in B, 12 military vehicles located in the usfk mountain base.

1. Whether it falls under the illegal investigation of a vessel;

A. Summary of the assertion

The informant of the instant case actively intervened in the instant case by providing the Defendants with a place where the Defendants meet with the investigation agency, while maintaining close relations with the investigation agency, and thereby inducing or aiding the instant crime. Accordingly, the prosecution of the instant case based on illegal undercover investigation should be dismissed as unlawful.

B. Determination

It should be determined by taking into account the type and nature of the relevant crime, the status and role of the inducer, the background and method of inducing the inducer, the response of the inducer caused by the inducement, the punishment history of the inducer, and the illegality of the inducing act itself, etc. Therefore, if the inducer who is directly related to the investigation agency appeals to the ruling or appraisal of the induced person, or appeals to, or refuses, monetary or psychological pressure or threat, or excessively intervene in, the crime by providing money to be used for the crime, etc. (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2005Do1247, Oct. 28, 2005). Whether it constitutes an illegal under a specific case, the determination should be made by taking into account the type and nature of the relevant crime, the status and role of the inducer, the situation and method of inducing the inducer, the response of the induced person caused by the inducement, and the illegality of the inducing person itself, which is directly related to the investigation agency, even if the investigating agency did not directly commit the crime.

In light of the above legal principles, comprehensively considering the following circumstances, which can be recognized by this court based on the evidence duly adopted and examined by this court, it is difficult to view the informant as a person directly related to the investigation agency, and it is also difficult to view the informant as a person inducing the Defendants’ criminal intent by excessive intervention. Therefore, this part of the Defendants and the defense counsel’s assertion is not acceptable.

① On December 5, 2014, V first reported the instant case to the AM investigator affiliated with the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency. AM investigator appears to have been in a friendly relationship between V and AM investigator because he/she was a person suspected of violating the National Security Act on May 2012, and thus, he/she was not in a friendly relationship between V and AM investigator. V and AM stated to the effect that, at this court, AM did not instruct AM to collect evidence regarding the instant case or intervene in the instant case to help the Defendants commit the instant crime.

② It is recognized that the date and time of meetings listed in the facts constituting the crime in the judgment was later than December 5, 2014, which V first informed to the investigation agency about the instant case. However, according to the Defendants’ contents of the Kakakao Stockholm dialogue among the Defendants, the e-mail sent and received by Defendant B and0, and the statement of Defendant V, etc., the Defendants were given an opinion with respect to the large size and quantity of interlock to be taken out to North Korea from December 5, 2014, the above information date, and Defendant A asked to lend the name of the trading company to North Korea via the Chinese Grand Port. < Amended by Presidential Decree No. 25789, Nov. 25, 2014>

③ Although V provided his office at the meeting place, it is difficult to deem that V actively participated in the instant case and caused the Defendants’ criminal intent. Moreover, the discussion on the release of Defendant A, 0, and V from the Republic of Korea to North Korea around January 14, 2015, and as a means of communication, V provided a help to create the Defendant A’s Kakakao Stockholm when exchanging e-mail address as a means of communication and connecting Kakao Stockholm, it is deemed that Defendant A requested to assist first, and it is difficult to deem that V actively participated in the instant case in light of the content of the record.

④ The defense counsel of the Defendants asserts that, based on the statement made by the witness Q in this court, the Defendants enticed the Defendants to assume and process the responsibility for customs clearance in the Chinese customs office, and actively involved in this case. However, in this court, the witness Q stated that, not directly or indirectly, that V would take the responsibility for customs clearance in the Chinese customs office, but that V would take the responsibility for customs clearance in the Chinese customs office, and that V would not have made such remarks in this court. Accordingly, it cannot be readily concluded that the witness Q’s legal statement alone made it difficult to conclude that V would take the responsibility for and process the customs clearance in the Chinese customs office.

2. Whether the president who met the Defendants is a member of an anti-government organization

A. Summary of the assertion

Although there is a driver's license under the name of the AJ, N(name, hereinafter the same shall apply) that the Defendants were aware of the sentiments of the SJ, the name of the SJ, and the name of the SJ, the name of the SJ, and the name of the SJ, each of the statements of the AJ and N are not reliable, and the above driver's license is forged.

B. Determination

In full view of the following circumstances, the evidence duly adopted and examined by this court may be comprehensively considered, and the statements made by AJ and N may be reliable. Thus, the president of SJ and N may recognize the facts as a member of the anti-government organization, as the ground for the meritorious work in North Korea 0. Therefore, this part of the defendants and defense counsel cannot be accepted.

① AJ, from around 191 to around 1999, worked as the Embassy AY in Thailand, made a statement in the investigation agency and this court that, in the name of SJ, the pictures of the driver’s license held by the president of SJ and the pictures of the S President taken on around 52014, personal data of the S President of SJ (Investigation Records 1095) were known to him/her at the time of his/her service in Thailand. At this court, AJ made a statement to the effect that 0 was naturally known during his/her service in Thailand because 0 was a member of the 35th office work in Thailand, and that 0 houses and his/her houses were connected from time to time. The statement by AJ is specific and clear, and there is no doubt about the circumstances in which 0 was known, as well as the circumstances in which the aforementioned pictures were identified as material belonging to the Thailand.

② Until early 2015, North Korean defectors stated in the investigation agency and this court that the photograph of the driver’s license held by the president and the photograph of the S President (in the investigation record 4025 to 4028 pages) taken by Q in around 2014 were AZ, the title of which is known to Q, and that Q is called S President. At the time of residing in North Korea on around 2008, they came to know Q by the introduction of the president, who is a trade company affiliated with the Uniform Electric Cable Department, at the time of residing in North Korea, and Q was a co-author engaged in trade activities in China from the president of the FA, and Q Q from the president of the FA stated to the effect that Q and Q were informed of the driver’s license and instructions of the SFK affiliated with Q.

In addition, in the investigation agency and this court, India had been staying in China for about four years from around 201 to around 4 years, Q was lasted in the North Korean border around March 2015, and Q was provided in the North Korean territory around November 2014, and Q was notified of the price and made a statement to him/her for the purpose of informing him/her of the other terms and conditions and requesting him/her of the price while Q was required to receive money from the due diligence country around November 2014. The statement to be made in Q was specific and clear, the circumstances in which Q was known, the circumstances in which Q was classified into Q as Q, the circumstances in which Q was classified as Q as Q, and the statement about Q's family relation and appearance are consistent with the statements and substitution of the AJJ concerning it.

③ According to the statements, etc. of V, AJ, andN, the general North Korean residents residing abroad are not allowed to move alone and have contact with the Republic of Korea, while North Korean colons can move alone and have contact with the Republic of Korea. This does not act with the North Korean colons, etc., but freely contact with the Republic of Korea including the Defendants.

④ S사장이 소지했던 0 명의로 된 북한 운전면허증에는 발급일, 합격일 등이 수기로 수정되어 있고, 수기로 수정된 1996년 당시에는 북한에서 주체연호(主體年號)를 사용하지 않고 있었고 사회안전부가 인민보안성으로 변경되기 전이었음에도 불구하고 위 운전면허증에는 주체연호를 의미하는 '주체'라는 부동문자, 운전면허증 발급주체로서 인민보안성이 기재되어 있어 위 운전면허증에 의문점이 있기는 하다. 그러나 AN의 법정진술에 의하면 S사장이 중국에서 운전면허증을 발급받는 과정에서 실기시험을 면제받기 위해서 주체연호로 기재된 일자를 서기(西紀) 방식으로 변경하였을 가능성이 있고, 북한 공작원의 경우 북한 내에서 운전면허증을 소지할 필요가 없으며 운전면허증의 기재 내용을 임의로 수정하더라도 북한 내에서 처벌받지 않을 수 있는 점, 수기로 수정되기 전의 일자를 기준으로는 주체연호를 사용하고 있었고 사회안전부가 인민보안성으로 변경된 후였음에도 불구하고 S사장이 자신의 필요에 의하여 일자를 소급하여 수정하였을 가능성도 있는 점 등에 비추어보면, 이러한 사정이 S사장이 북한 공작원이라는 점에 대한 합리적인 의심을 가지게 할 사정이라고 보이지 않는다.

3. Whether the Defendants recognized the fact that O was a member of an anti-government organization

A. Summary of the assertion

Even if 0 was the North Korean copier, the Defendants did not take an ordinary member of the copier in North Korea, such as joining with many people, including the Defendants, or joining the Defendants at an open place. Therefore, the Defendants could not be aware that 0 was the North Korean copier.

B. Determination

In full view of the following circumstances, the evidence duly adopted and examined by this court can be found to have been recognized by the defendant as a member of an anti-government organization, such as the North Korean official author. Therefore, this part of the defendants and defense counsel cannot be accepted.

① From January 9, 2015, the Defendants discussed the size, quantity, etc. of heavy typists located in the Madong-si, China, as well as 0: (a) the Defendants referred to as “YYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY

③ Defendant A introduced V and Q as North Korean military head.

0 Unlike ordinary North Korean residents, 00 people in China did not act with North Korea's guard, etc., and had them in China, and freely contacted with Korean people, including the Defendants, and freely have access to the places where Korean people gather.

4. Whether the defendants' act of exporting large-sized sacrifies to North Korea constitutes an act dangerous to the existence and security of the State or democratic fundamental order;

A. Summary of the assertion

Most of the different terms sent by the Defendants were different from passenger cars, so it was not possible to use them for military purposes. Moreover, although the Defendants were prohibited from bringing them into China from the beginning of the dispatch of the Defendants, V deceiving the Defendants, thereby allowing the Defendants to dispatch the middle ray to China. Therefore, the Defendants’ act of exporting the middle ray to North Korea does not constitute an act of endangering the existence and security of the State or democratic fundamental order.

B. Determination

The crime of meeting, communication, etc. under Article 8 (1) of the National Security Act is established when, with the knowledge of the fact that it may endanger the existence and security of the State or democratic fundamental order, contact with a member of an anti-government organization or a person under its order by means of meeting, communication, or any other means, and the act of meeting, etc. is obviously dangerous to the existence and security of the State or democratic fundamental order (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2003Do758, Apr. 17, 2008). Meanwhile, whether an actor has awareness of such a fact should be objectively determined by taking into account the developments leading up to the communication, such as meeting, communication, etc., and the contents of conversation and contact, and the situation before and after the meeting, etc., and such recognition shall not be enough if there is an incomplete perception that the act may endanger or endanger the national existence and security or democratic basic order (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 200Do3194, Sep. 21, 2019).

In light of the above legal principles, in full view of the following circumstances, it is reasonable to view that the Defendants’ act of exporting middle and high-speed language to North Korea constitutes an act dangerous to the existence and security of the State or democratic fundamental order. Accordingly, this part of the Defendants and the defense counsel’s assertion is not acceptable.

① According to the statements, etc. by AO and the Director of the Technical Office of AV of the Defense Acquisition Program Administration who is in charge of export business, etc. of strategic items or defense materials at the BA office, the large scale of which the Defendants attempted to export to North Korea is used for trucks, buses, special vehicles, etc., and especially '11.00-20', '9.00-20', '14.00-20' and '14.20-20' are the specifications used for military trucks and they are strategic items requiring export permission.

② From April 209 to May 5, 2009, according to the statements, etc. of the head of AV Association planning and management office AK: (a) around April 2009 to the AV Association office; (b) AV staff member of the National Intelligence Service was found in the Republic of Korea, and 20 U.S. 1) was transported into the South-North Korean port through the China's short-dong and cooperation port; (c) the trade company affiliated with the North Korean military department continuously promoted the import of the above high-speed ta for use in military vehicles, etc.; (d) requested to give attention; (e) AK posted the announcement containing the above contents on the AV website around May 14, 2009; and (e) on May 21, 2009, AK posted the announcement to China at the representative meeting of the recovery and recycling enterprise; and (e) large-scale tata can be used in North Korea; and (e) it is necessary to notify the participants of the conference at the time of exportation to China.

From January 9, 2015, at the time of discussion about the size and quantity of 0% and 17, 18, 16, 25%, 13, 14, 100, and 20, more than 20,000, and 13, and 18,000,000 were required. On January 12, 2015, it is recognized that 13 through 18,000 in the estimate attached to the note sent by Defendant B to Defendant B around January 12, 2015, on the other hand, 590 in total, and more than 20,00 in total, 60.

However, the number of different specifications has changed several times, and finally two containers have been loaded. A total of 931 typists for passenger cars (not more than 19 typists) has been loaded in one container, and a total of 263 typists (not less than 20 typists) have been loaded in the other container.

④ In light of the fact that the 0th status is not the change of trade date, it is considerably high possibility that the Defendants attempted to import 0 for the purpose of using a vehicle loaded in another container, which is not a container loaded on a large scale, for the purpose of using it in the North Korean forces. Furthermore, as seen earlier, around January 9, 2015, the Defendants discussed about the size, quantity, etc. of the 0th class in the WDabadong-si located in China as of January 18, 2015, and Defendant A told Defendant A to the effect that “The 0th class is absent from the lack of training,” and Defendant A attempted to export from V’s house to the North Korean forces on April 18, 2015.

⑤ N. However, according to the statement, etc. of N. of N., the following facts are also stated: (a) China's China's Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese

5. Whether Defendant A, who received an order on the circulation of counterfeited USD A, escaped to China to lock the Republic of Korea and consult on the accomplishment of its purpose;

A. Summary of the assertion

From April 18, 2015, Defendant A entered Korea on April 20, 2015 and Defendant A did not verify whether there was forgerys referred to by Defendant A, but did not escape to China on April 20, 2015 according to the originally scheduled schedule, and was returned to China on May 2, 2015, and did not escape to China after being issued an order on the distribution of counterfeited USD.

B. Determination

In full view of the following circumstances, the evidence duly adopted and examined by this court may be considered as a whole: (a) the fact of escape to China is recognized in order to inquire into whether the defendant A can distribute forged USD; and (b) the defendant A has escaped from China to the Republic of Korea after being ordered to inquire into whether the defendant A can distribute forged USD. Therefore, this part of the defendant A and the defense counsel's assertion is rejected.

① On April 18, 2015, Defendant A received a request from Nonparty A to the effect that he/she can distribute counterfeited USD 0 from V’s house located in the Dong-dong, China, and asked Defendant A to the effect that “it is not known at the time of passing the machinery. At a few pages of the sample, Korea will be seen as US$ 1, a few pages.” Then, Defendant A entered the Republic of Korea on April 20, 2015, and came to the Republic of Korea on May 2, 2015, and was sentenced to heavy punishment on suspicion that he/she distributed forged USD 0 in Korea.

② It is not necessarily necessary to identify whether to distribute forged USD 1.0. Moreover, Defendant A asked V to “the custody of forged USD 1.0.0” before entering the Republic of Korea on April 20, 2015. Defendant A received a forged photograph from V on or around April 22, 2015. As such, Defendant A did not confirm whether the forged USD 10 referred to actually existed or not, even if Defendant A entered the Republic of Korea on April 20, 2015 according to the originally scheduled schedule and returned to China on May 2, 2015, it cannot be said that Defendant A could not escape from China to consult on the implementation of its purpose.

6. Whether the e-mail, etc. of the Defendants is inadmissible as illegally collected evidence

A. Summary of the assertion

Although the content of the e-mail account and the Kakakao Stockholm conversation with the Defendants are stored in the server of a telecommunications business operator, even if the Defendants were to be informed of the fact that the search and seizure warrant was executed in advance, it cannot be concealed or destroyed by accessing the server, and thus, the Defendants do not constitute “where urgency is required,” the exception to the duty to notify the Defendants. However, in executing the search and seizure warrant regarding the contents of the e-mail account and the Kakakao Stockholm conversation, the investigative agency omitted the above notification procedure and did not guarantee the Defendants’ right to participate. Accordingly, the content of the e-mail account and the

B. Determination

A suspect or defense counsel may participate in the execution of a warrant of search and seizure (Articles 219 and 121 of the Criminal Procedure Act), and, in principle, the date, time and place of execution shall be notified in advance to the suspect, etc. (main sentence of Article 122 of the Criminal Procedure Act), but the above notification may be omitted in cases where urgency is required (proviso of Article 122 of the Criminal Procedure Act). Here, “when urgency is required” means “when evidence is informed prior to the execution of a warrant of search and seizure may be concealed if evidence is concealed.” Thus, it is reasonable to interpret that it is difficult to hold the search and seizure effective (see Supreme Court Decision 201Do7455, Oct. 11, 2012).

With respect to the e-mail account, among the contents of the e-mail account with respect to the Defendants subject to search and seizure, the date of opening the e-mail account, logs recording, etc., it is impossible to modify or delete the said data unless they are through employees of the relevant telecommunications business operator or through professional hacks. However, in the event that the Defendants informed the Defendants of the fact of executing the search and seizure warrant in advance, e-mail materials and the Kakakao Stockholm conversation, etc. stored in the course of keeping the transmission and reception of the e-mail account among the content of the e-mail account, are likely to modify or delete the relevant data stored in the server after accessing the e-mail and Kakakao Stockholm Stockholm account via computers or mobile phones. In this case, it appears that the investigative agency’s act of executing the warrant of search and seizure regarding the contents of the e-mail account of the Defendants and the contents of the Kakao Kao x conversation

Application of Statutes

1. Article relevant to the facts constituting an offense and the selection of punishment;

A. Defendant A: Article 8(1) of the National Security Act; Article 30 of the Criminal Act; Article 9(3) and (2) of the National Security Act; Article 30 of the Criminal Act; Article 6(2) of the National Security Act (the point of diving and escape; the choice of limited imprisonment)

B. Defendant B: Article 8(1) of the National Security Act, Article 30 of the Criminal Act, Article 9(3) and (2) of the National Security Act, and Article 30 of the Criminal Act (the attempted provision of convenience)

1. Aggravation for concurrent crimes;

(a) Defendant A: The first sentence of Article 37 of the Criminal Act, Articles 38 (1) 2 and 50 of the Criminal Act, and the crime of violation of the National Security Act (in the case of escape from special diving) due to the very heavy diving of the nature of the crime, the penalty against Defendant A is one concurrent crime;

(b) Defendant B: the former part of Article 37, Article 38 (1) 2, and Article 50 of the Criminal Act (aggravating concurrent crimes with the punishment prescribed for a violation of the National Security Act with the largest offense)

1. Discretionary mitigation;

Defendant A: Articles 53 and 55(1)3 of the Criminal Act (The conditions favorable to the reasons for sentencing below)

1. Concurrent imposition of suspension of qualifications;

Defendants: Article 14 of the National Security Act

Reasons for sentencing

1. The scope of punishment by law;

(a) Defendant A: Imprisonment for 2 years and 6 months to 22 months;

(b) Defendant B: Imprisonment with prison labor for one month to 15 years;

2. Whether the sentencing criteria are applied;

No sentencing criteria are set for each crime in the judgment.

3. Determination of sentence;

Although North Korea is a partner of dialogue and cooperation to seek constant exchanges and cooperation for the peaceful unification of our nation, North Korea threatens the existence of the Republic of Korea and our free democracy system due to the fluence of power, the maintenance of Dominant regime, and the series of armed forces, and threatens the existence of the Republic of Korea and our free democracy system. On May 24, 2010, the Government of the Republic of Korea took measures 5.24 as a matter of principle controlling the trade in South and North Korea and the projects for supporting South and North Korea, even though it consulted with the North Korean official of North Korea to remove large scale, etc. that can be exclusively used for military use from North Korea, and it was inevitable for Defendant A tried to remove large scale, etc. from North Korea, etc., which are inconsistent with our free democratic constitutional order, and tried to escape from North Korea to the Republic of Korea to the extent that it is dangerous for the Republic of Korea to escape from the Republic of Korea to the extent that it goes against its basic order.

However, the defendants did not have any history of criminal punishment for the same crime, the violation of the National Security Act (Provision of Convenience) was committed against the attempted crime, and the large capital was not actually carried in North Korea. The defendant A takes into account the favorable circumstances, such as the scope of participation in taking out large capital gains into North Korea relatively minor. In addition, all the sentencing factors specified in the records and arguments of this case, including the defendants' age, environment, character and conduct, motive and means of the crime, and circumstances after the crime, shall be comprehensively considered.

Judges Cho Jae-hwan

Judge Park Jae-il