[소유권이전등기청구사건][고집1969민(1),347]
Cases which recognized the existence of soldier's eligibility to be a farm at the time of purchase by the whole purport of the pleading.
Pursuant to Article 19 (2) of the Farmland Reform Act, a person eligible to purchase farmland is not limited to the scarcity at the time of sale and purchase, but is sufficient only to verify that there is the purpose of self-fluence of the purchased farmland in accordance with the language and text of Article 51 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act. Since the fact that a soldier who purchased farmland has his/her wife and his/her family members and intends to remove farmland in the future, he/she is recognized by the purport of the pleading, it cannot be readily concluded that he/she is currently a soldier and is not eligible to purchase farmland
Article 19 of the Farmland Reform Act
Plaintiff
Defendant
Seoul Central District Court (67Ga10033) in the first instance trial
The appeal is dismissed.
Expenses for appeal shall be borne by the defendant.
The defendant shall implement the registration procedure for transfer of ownership based on sale on December 29, 1966 with respect to the real estate stated in the attached list to the plaintiff.
Litigation costs shall be borne by the defendant.
The original judgment shall be revoked.
The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.
All the costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the plaintiff in the first and second instances.
If the contents of Gap evidence No. 1-4 (each copy of the register), Gap evidence No. 3 (Land Sales Contract), Eul evidence No. 14 (Land Sales Contract), and all the purport of the court below's and the non-party witness's testimony (excluding the part not trusted in the front and rear) and the parties' pleading, the defendant shall pay 219,000 won and interest thereon borrowed from the plaintiff on December 29, 1966, until March 30, 1967. In order to secure the defendant's above obligation, the defendant shall pay 219,000 won and interest thereon borrowed from the plaintiff to the plaintiff on December 29, 196, and it can be acknowledged that the plaintiff agreed to perform the procedure for ownership transfer registration for the reason of sale on December 29, 196, and the non-party witness's testimony (excluding the non-party witness's testimony) shall not be trusted and there is no evidence to believe otherwise.
(A) The Defendant: (a) concluded that the Plaintiff shall carry out the registration of ownership transfer with respect to the answer to the Plaintiff with a view to having the Plaintiff know his wife who is considered as a matter of securing a claim against the Defendant; (b) in formality, the two parties prepare a sales contract by proposal; and (c) even if not, there is no evidence to acknowledge that part of the Nonparty’s testimony other than the Nonparty’s testimony, which was not believed by the Plaintiff’s coercion, was made by the Plaintiff’s coercion.
(B) The plaintiff asserts that the plaintiff could not acquire this answer as much as he is not a farmer because he is a soldier. Thus, the plaintiff's soldier can be acknowledged by the non-party's testimony, but the plaintiff's eligibility to purchase farmland pursuant to Article 19 (2) of the Farmland Reform Act is not limited to the fright farmer at the time of sale and purchase, and it is sufficient to prove that the purpose of the purchase of farmland is not that of the fright farmer at the time of sale and purchase, and it is sufficient to prove that there is a purpose of self-frighting the purchase of farmland. Thus, it is recognized in the preceding purport of the argument that the plaintiff's intention to remove the plaintiff from the fright field where he has his wife and family members, and it is not a farmer at the present time, so it cannot be concluded that the plaintiff is not a soldier and the plaintiff is not a farmer.
(C) In the sale of this answer, since there was no proof of the purchase and sale of farmland by the government office at the seat of the location under Article 19(2) of the Farmland Reform Act, the sale is deemed null and void. Accordingly, according to each content of the evidence No. 4-1 (Evidence) and No. 2 (Self-Cultivating Farmland Certification Board) that is recognized as the authenticity, this answer was not acquired by the government as the defendant's own farmland, and even after the plaintiff purchased this answer and submitted this answer, it can be recognized that the government office at the seat where the farmland owned does not exceed three information.
However, according to the contents of Eul evidence Nos. 4, 8 (Certification), 9 (Delivery of Request for Cancellation of Farmland Certification), 10 (Notice of Cancellation of Self-Cultivating Farmland), and 11 and 12 (Meeting of Request for Cancellation of Farmland Certification), this dry field and paddy field are small works that the defendant cultivated in the past from the first order of June 1967, and the above evidence Nos. 4-1 and 2 delivered to the plaintiff on Nov. 27, 1968, as well as the fact that the above evidence Nos. 4-1 and 2 was issued to the plaintiff on Nov. 27, 1968 without the defendant's own opinion, and it is recognized that the Myeon was issued by the government office with which the head of Gun should issue a farmland certification, and that the farmland required to be sold in Article 19 (2) of the Farmland Reform Act does not constitute the so-called farmland reform without the consent of the government, so long as it does not constitute the so-called farmland reform without the consent of the government.
(D) Finally, the defendant, if he borrowed 218,00 won from the plaintiff and did not repay it to the plaintiff in excess of 800,000 won at the market price, was promised to pay in kind. Thus, this is a invalid contract in violation of Articles 607 and 608 of the Civil Code. However, it is argued that the market price at the time of the promise to pay in kind and answer is a invalid contract in violation of Article 607 and 608 of the Civil Code. However, the above provisions of the Civil Code do not have any evidence that the market price at the time of the promise to pay in kind is the same as the head of the defendant. Since the defendant did not pay in full to the plaintiff the obligation of the person, the above provisions of the Civil Code are invalid
Thus, the defendant is obliged to implement the procedure for transfer of ownership due to the sale of December 29, 1966 as to the transfer and answer to the plaintiff as agreed.
Therefore, the plaintiff's claim for objection shall be accepted. Since the court below is just in conclusion, it is dismissed in accordance with Article 384 of the Civil Procedure Act, and it is so decided as per Disposition by applying Articles 89 and 95 of the same Act with respect to the burden of litigation costs.
[Attachment List omitted]
Judges Cho Jong-dae (Presiding Judge)