[물품인도청구사건][고집1970민(1),343]
Qualifications for defendant in filing a lawsuit for recovery of possession
Even in a case where the Defendant Company, without legitimate authority, destroyed the automobile possessed and operated by the Plaintiff under the land entry contract, and transferred it to another borrower for possession and operation under the land entry contract, the direct possessor of the automobile occupied and operated under the land entry contract is the so-called borrower, and the Defendant Company is only an indirect possessor, and even if the Defendant Company lost the Plaintiff’s possession, the lawsuit of possession recovery should be instituted against the person who actually occupies the automobile.
Article 204 of the Civil Act
Supreme Court Decision 73Da703 Decided December 11, 1973 (Article 204(5)307 of the Civil Act, No. 566 of the Court Gazette, No. 10193 Decided December 11, 197)
Plaintiff
Defendant corporation
Daegu District Court of First Instance (68Ga3240)
The judgment of the first instance shall be revoked.
The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.
All the costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the plaintiff through the first and second trials.
The defendant delivers one bus registered in the name of the defendant to the plaintiff (vehicle number omitted) and pays money at the rate of KRW 8,000 per day from June 21, 1968 to the delivery of the above vehicle.
Litigation costs shall be borne by the defendant.
A provisional execution may be effected only under paragraph (1).
The same shall apply to the order.
The plaintiff's representative, who is registered in the name of the defendant (vehicle number omitted), is a motor vehicle owned by the plaintiff and attached to the defendant. The defendant delivered the above motor vehicle to the non-party 1, who is the borrower of the defendant company, and caused the above non-party to operate the motor vehicle. Thus, the plaintiff first claims the transfer of the above motor vehicle by ownership. Thus, according to Article 5 of the Road Transport Vehicles Act, the acquisition and loss of the ownership of the motor vehicle becomes effective after being registered. Thus, even though the fact that the motor vehicle is registered in the name of the defendant is not a dispute between the parties, even if the so-called "the owner of the plaintiff's automobile" was left in the name of the defendant, there is no ownership of the motor vehicle in this case to the plaintiff.
Therefore, the plaintiff's request for delivery of automobile premised on ownership is groundless.
Then, on June 21, 1968, the plaintiff asserted that the defendant, without legitimate authority, deprived the plaintiff from the plaintiff and transferred the automobile possessed by the plaintiff to the non-party 1 who is the borrower. Thus, the plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's right of possession. Thus, the plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff'
The plaintiff's attorney asserts that the above land entry contract still remains valid under the above land entry contract with the defendant. The defendant's attorney asserted that the above land entry contract was cancelled. Thus, since part of Gap evidence Nos. 1-1 through 10 (share certificates) without dispute over the establishment is a public document, Eul's evidence Nos. 3-1 through 7 (Evidence No. 1-7) which is presumed to have been established due to non-party No. 2's testimony of the court below, the above land entry contract was not made under the condition that the above land entry contract was made under the above land entry contract with the defendant No. 9, and the above land entry contract was made under the condition that the above 2-party No. 3,2, witness at the court below's decision No. 4,5, and 6's testimony was made under the condition that the above land entry contract was not made under the above 9-party No. 2's original ownership and the defendant's defendant company's remaining share certificates were not made under the above contract with the defendant company's non-party No. 9.
Therefore, the plaintiff's claim for damages arising from failure to operate a motor vehicle on the premise that the request for the delivery of the motor vehicle of this case based on the premise that the above ownership, possessory right or the existence of the entry contract is reasonable, shall not be determined any further, and the judgment of the court of first instance is unfair in conclusion, and thus, it is so decided as per Disposition by applying Articles 95 and 89 of the Civil Procedure Act as to the bearing of litigation costs.
Judges Kim Tae-tae (Presiding Judge)