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red_flag_2(영문) 대전고등법원 2017. 8. 30. 선고 2017누11501 판결

[보상금증액][미간행]

Plaintiff, appellant and appellee

Plaintiff (Attorney Lee Jong-sung, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Defendant, Appellant and Appellant

Jung-gu, Daejeon Metropolitan City (Attorney Park Jong-chul, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Conclusion of Pleadings

August 10, 2017

The first instance judgment

Daejeon District Court Decision 2016Guhap101449 Decided May 4, 2017

Text

1. All appeals filed by the plaintiff and the defendant are dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by each party.

Purport of claim and appeal

1. Purport of claim

From April 24, 2015, the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff 900,320,050 won with 5% interest per annum from the date of delivery of a copy of the application for modification of the purport of the claim of this case and the cause of the claim of this case until the date of delivery of a copy of the application for modification, and 15% interest per annum from the following day to the date of full payment.

2. Purport of appeal

A. The plaintiff

Of the judgment of the court of first instance, the part against the plaintiff falling under the order to pay the following shall be revoked. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff 531,178,100 won with 5% interest per annum from October 20, 2015 to the service date of a copy of the application for modification of the purport of the claim and the cause of the claim in this case, and 15% interest per annum from the next day to the day of full payment.

B. Defendant

The part of the judgment of the first instance against the defendant shall be revoked, and the plaintiff's claim corresponding to the above revocation shall be dismissed.

Reasons

1. Quotation of judgment of the first instance;

The reasoning for this Court’s explanation concerning this case is as follows: (a) add “relevant statutes” to the “relevant statutes” attached to the judgment of the court of first instance; and (b) the pertinent part of the judgment of the court of first instance is as stated in the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, in addition to the dismissal as follows; and (c) thereby, it is acceptable in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and

○ 3. The deposit “(684,994,550 won in total)” was made after the third party’s deposit was made.

“64,971,050 won” in Part 4 of the 17th page shall be added to “(20,023,50 won excluding total amount of deposit 684,94,550 won)”.

○○ 5’s number of 14 m2,00,000 m2,000 m2,000 m2,000 m2,000 m2,000 m2,000 m2,000 m2,000 m2,000 m2.

○ Violation 6, 6, and 7 of the 6th page "parking lot" is partitioned into "site".

○ 8. Note 5 of the 8th page by inserting “the road directly” following the 5th page

Pursuant to the Act on Special Measures for Designation and Management of Development Restriction Zones (hereinafter referred to as the “Act on Special Measures for Designation and Management of Development Restriction Zones”), the “Act on the Development Restriction Zones” in Part 9 No. 3

○ The following shall be added under Part 8 of title 9:

In addition, the plaintiff asserts that "the defendant's failure to cancel the designation of the development restriction zone for the land of this case is for the implementation of the project of this case, which is a specific public project, and the situation that the land of this case is provided for the project of this case is excluded, the defendant's act of not cancelling the development restriction zone as above is objectively obvious to fall under the deviation and abuse of the right of planning discretion, and therefore, the land of this case should be assessed as the land of this case in

However, in full view of the facts and evidence as seen earlier, and the following circumstances acknowledged in addition to the overall purport of the pleadings as a result of the fact-finding conducted by the Daejeon Metropolitan City Mayor, it is difficult to view that the Defendant’s act of not releasing a development restriction zone constitutes a deviation or abuse of the right of planning discretion if it is excluded from the circumstances that the land expropriated in this case is provided for the instant project. Accordingly, the Plaintiff

(1) Since the land to be expropriated was designated as a development restriction zone on June 27, 1973, its designation has been maintained until now.

(2) The project of this case is a construction work for building a water-frame parking lot; parking lots in development restriction zones are installed with permission from an administrative agency in accordance with Article 12 of the Development Restriction Zone Act; Article 13(1) and attached Table 1 and 13(3)(d) of the Enforcement Decree of the Act on Special Measures for Designation and Management of Development Restriction Zones; and for this purpose, the

(3) As long as the instant expropriated land has been designated as a development-restricted zone prior to the implementation of the instant project, it is difficult to deem that the Plaintiff is unreasonable discrimination compared to the owners of land, which is not a development-restricted zone adjacent to the instant expropriated land, solely on the ground that the amount of compensation is likely to decrease as it was maintained without releasing the development-restricted zone

“Compensation for the instant objection” in the last sentence of the 9th place shall be construed as “amount obtained by subtracting 20,023,50 won from total deposit amount of KRW 684,94,550,000.”

2. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is justified within the scope of the above recognition, and the remaining claims are dismissed as it is without merit. The judgment of the court of first instance is just in conclusion, and each appeal of the plaintiff and the defendant is dismissed as it is without merit.

[Attachment]

The judge’s seat (Presiding Judge) Ma-hee Park Jong-hee

(1) Although the Plaintiff’s written application for change of the purport of the claim and the cause of the claim, as of April 24, 2017, is stipulated as “ October 20, 2015,” it is obvious that it is by mistake (the end of the above written application is referred to as “ April 24, 2015,” the end of the said application is referred to as “No. 24, 2015”). As such, the Plaintiff