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(영문) 대법원 2015. 2. 16. 선고 2011다101155 판결

[종회의원선거무효확인등][미간행]

Main Issues

[1] Whether there is a benefit in confirmation of a lawsuit seeking confirmation of the status of the representative or member of a religious organization which is an unincorporated association against the representative or individual who is not an organization (negative)

[2] The validity of a resolution where a general meeting of an association which is not a legal entity resolves on matters not mentioned as an objective in the notice of convening a meeting (negative in principle)

[Reference Provisions]

[1] Article 250 of the Civil Procedure Act / [2] Articles 31, 71, and 72 of the Civil Act

Reference Cases

[1] Supreme Court Decision 91Da12905 Decided July 12, 1991 (Gong1991, 2156), Supreme Court Decision 2006Da65774 Decided February 10, 201 (Gong2011Sang, 546) / [2] Supreme Court en banc Decision 2004Da37775 Decided April 20, 2006 (Gong2006Sang, 851), Supreme Court Decision 2010Da102403 Decided February 14, 2013

Plaintiff-Appellant

Plaintiff 1 and one other (Law Firm Shinh, et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant-Appellee

Korean Non-School Teachers and one other (Law Firm Sejong, Attorneys Lee Jae-hee et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul High Court Decision 2010Na96203 decided October 27, 2011

Text

The part of the judgment of the court below against Defendant 2 is reversed, the part against Defendant 2 in the judgment of the court of first instance is revoked, and all the lawsuit against Defendant 2 is dismissed. The part of the judgment of the court below on the claim for confirmation of invalidity of appointment by the president of the General Director of the Office of Education against the defendant who is not teaching staff is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court. The remaining appeal against the defendant not teaching staff against the defendant is dismissed.

Reasons

1. We examine ex officio the legality of the lawsuit against the defendant 2.

Where a lawsuit is filed against a representative or an individual of a religious organization which is an unincorporated association in a confirmation lawsuit as to the status of the representative or member, even if the judgment citing such a claim is rendered, it cannot be deemed that the judgment has an effect on the relevant organization, and thus, it cannot be the most effective and appropriate method to fundamentally resolve disputes between the parties surrounding the status of the representative or member. Thus, a claim filed against the representative or an individual of a religious organization without filing a claim against the said organization is unlawful as there is no benefit of confirmation (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 91Da12905, Jul. 12, 1991; 2006Da65774, Feb. 10, 2011).

According to the records, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the defendants as the paper papers of the non-propony species of the defendant (hereinafter "the non-propony species of the defendant plaintiff") against the defendants on April 3, 2009 against the defendant, seeking confirmation of the election of the members of the clan, the election of the members of the clan who decided to be elected on April 3, 2009, and the appointment of the head of the General Affairs Office who appointed the defendant 2 on April 13, 2009. However, the court below added the plaintiff's claim against the defendant 2 to confirm that the above defendant is not in the representative status of the defendant propon species of the defendant. The court of first instance dismissed the plaintiffs' claim, while the court below dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal and dismissed the above claim against the defendant 2 added at

However, in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, the effect of the election of the members of the subdivision of the headquarters and the appointment of the president of the president of the headquarters against Defendant 2, or accordingly, the Plaintiffs disputing the status as the representative of Defendant 2 may remove the legal apprehensions or risks surrounding the appointment of the president of the headquarters of the headquarters of the headquarters of the headquarters of the headquarters of the headquarters of the headquarters of the headquarters of the Republic of Korea upon Defendant 2’s confirmation of the validity or the existence of the status against the original species. The confirmation judgment against Defendant 2, who is not the original species of the headquarters, cannot be the most effective and appropriate way to resolve the dispute between the parties because it does not affect the original species of the headquarters, and thus, all the lawsuits claiming each of the above confirmation against Defendant 2 do not have the interest of immediate confirmation.

Thus, all of the lawsuits against Defendant 2 are illegal as there is no benefit of confirmation, and this is an ex officio investigation and the court should have judged ex officio without regard to the party’s assertion. Nevertheless, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the benefit of confirmation, which is the requirement of litigation in the lawsuit for confirmation, and thereby adversely affected the conclusion of the judgment.

2. We examine the grounds of appeal (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed) as to the defendant's original species.

A. As to the change of the representative of the defendant original species

If the representative of an association which is not a juristic person loses his/her power of representation, the proceedings shall be interrupted, but even if the representative is changed, the proceedings shall not be interrupted (see Articles 64, 58, 235, 238, etc. of the Civil Procedure Act).

According to the records, the documents submitted to the effect that the president of the headquarters of the Republic of Korea was changed during the period of the final appeal of this case. However, even if the representative of the headquarters of the defendant headquarters was changed, the litigation procedure has not been interrupted as long as the representative of the headquarters of the defendant headquarters was changed. Thus, the grounds of appeal on

B. As to the grounds of appeal on confirmation of invalidation of the election of a branch of a meeting (ground of appeal Nos. 1, 2, and 3)

In addition to the reasoning of the first instance judgment, the lower court determined that: (a) the Defendants failed to properly grasp the number of the closing candidates in the process of election of the members of the instant sub-committee; or (b) it is insufficient to recognize that the Defendants received an allocation of the fixed number of the members of the sub-committee from the court, which is different from the actual number of the closing candidates, by applying for a permit for election of the members of the sub-committee; (b) the Defendants’ submission of the non-party 2 to recommend the non-party 1 to the Seoul High Court 207Ra1580, which was not the party and the non-party 2 recommended by the non-party 3 of the non-party 2 of the non-party 2 of the non-party 2 of the non-party 2 of the non-party 1’s recommendation process, based on the circumstance that the non-party 3 of the non-party 2 of the non-party 1’s recommendation process could not be seen as being unlawful by submitting the above recommendation process to the non-party 2 of the voting.

On the grounds of a written judgment, a judgment on a party’s assertion and other means of offence and defense shall be indicated to the extent that it can be recognized that the text is fair, and there is no need to determine all allegations by the parties or methods of offence and defense (Article 208 of the Civil Procedure Act).

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment and the reasoning of the first instance judgment cited by the lower court in light of the evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations beyond the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the relevant legal doctrine, or omitting judgment, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment

C. As to the defect in the notice procedure among the grounds of appeal on the invalidity of the appointment of the president of the KIFK (Ground of appeal No. 7)

(1) According to the reasoning of the lower judgment and the first instance judgment as cited by the lower court and the evidence duly admitted, the following facts are revealed.

(A) The defendant Won-su is a Buddhist organization composed of the paper by the constitution of the Republic of Korea, which has a branch body as a legislative body, and does not have a general assembly of the paper as its constituent members.

The final council shall be comprised of the members of the final council elected by the election commission of each school district in proportion to the number allocated by each school district in proportion to the number of pages, and shall have the function of determining the important will of the defendant Filialty, such as the amendment of the constitution, the enactment of the subordinate law, deliberation on and approval of the budget, the appointment of the senior secretary general and the director general, etc.

The president of the General Affairs Institute is the chief executive officer, who exercises overall control over and executes the overall affairs of Defendant Filial Species, and shall be elected at the end of the Council and appointed by the closing.

(B) From June 9, 1989, Defendant Won-sung began internal disputes over the appointment of the head of the Si/Gun/Gu, and the dispute has been pending. Defendant 2 was appointed as temporary closure from the appellate court of the non-contentious case on August 25, 2008 by the Seoul High Court, but it was limited to the exercise of authority to obtain prior permission from the Seoul High Court with regard to the election of the members of the Si/Gun/Gu council, the organization of the branch council, and the convocation of the branch council to elect the members of the Gu/Si/Gun council.

Accordingly, on November 7, 2008, Defendant 2 obtained permission from the Seoul High Court to appoint Nonparty 3 as a temporary person to temporarily perform the duties of the president in order to organize the closure of the Defendant Filial Species. Furthermore, on March 4, 2009, Defendant 2 obtained from the Seoul High Court the schedule and procedure for selecting the members of the subdivision of the Defendant Filial Species from Seoul High Court, and the permission to hold the closure of the subdivision from April 13, 2009, and confirmed the election of 24 members of the subdivision on April 3, 2009 by each school district through the election process of the subdivision.

(C) On April 13, 2009, Defendant Won-sung held the closure session on April 13, 2009 (hereinafter “the closure of the instant case”), but did not notify the members of the agenda of the meeting of its purpose or agenda in advance.

(D) Of the 24 members of the instant subdivision, 19 members among the 24 members of the instant subdivision were present. At the instant subdivision, some of the members of the instant subdivision raised an objection on the ground that the details of the agenda were not notified in advance. However, the 13 members of the instant subdivision consented to the election of the chief secretary at the relevant subdivision, Defendant 2 recommended as a sole candidate and was elected as the chief secretary. Accordingly, Defendant 2, the temporary president, appointed him as the chief secretary.

(E) Article 17 of the Closing Association Act provides that the chairperson shall convene a meeting with the consent of the closing of the meeting one month prior to the opening of the meeting, but the first closing after the election of a member of the meeting shall be the closing of the meeting. Moreover, there is no specific provision regarding the method of convening a meeting of the closing of the meeting.

(2) (A) In the case of an incorporated association, the convocation of the general meeting shall be made by sending a notice stating the purpose of the meeting or by other methods stipulated in the articles of incorporation (Article 71 of the Civil Act). If there is no provision in the articles of incorporation, the general meeting may make a resolution only on the matters notified in accordance with the above procedures (Article 72 of the Civil Act). The purpose of the resolution is to allow members to attend the meeting with prior knowledge of the purpose of the resolution in advance and prepare for the objection against the resolution. Thus, the purpose of the meeting is to ensure that the members are informed of the purpose of the meeting. As such, the provisions of the Civil Act which are not premised on legal personality apply mutatis mutandis to an unincorporated association, in principle, to an unincorporated association (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2004Da37755, Apr. 20, 2006). If an unincorporated association’s general meeting fails to state such matters as the purpose of notice of convening the meeting, such resolution shall be null and void in principle unless all members attend the meeting and make a resolution (see Supreme Court Decision 2014.

Defendant Won-su, which is an unincorporated association, does not have a separate general meeting composed of paper books, and the branch council is in charge of the same function as the general meeting in the association as the representative body that determines the important intent of the branch council of each school district on behalf of the members of the branch council. Therefore, the procedures and legal principles for the general meeting of an unincorporated association are likely to be applied to the branch council of Defendant Won-su, which is a non-corporate association.

(B) Article 17 of the Act on the Closing Session provides that the chairperson shall convene a meeting with the consent of the branch of the meeting one month prior to the opening of the meeting. The term of a meeting held one month prior to the above appears to have an intention to inform the branch of the meeting of the purpose of the meeting and to provide the members with the period for deciding whether to participate in the meeting and their opinions on the supporting and opposing opinions on the agenda, which is the said purpose. In particular, in the case of the election of the chief executive officer, etc., it is reasonable to allow the branch of the meeting or the branch of the meeting to recommend appropriate candidates and to make a resolution at the meeting through prior procedures such as verification or exchange of opinions on the candidate, so it is necessary to notify the purpose of the meeting with a considerable period of time. Therefore, the provisions of the Act on the Closing Session also stipulate the purpose of notifying in advance the agenda of the meeting.

Although this case’s closing session is the first closing after the election of the members of the council, it is possible to convene a temporary closing session, other than the chairperson, pursuant to the law of the council, but this is merely the fact that the president of the council has not been elected. As such, such circumstance alone does not disregard the purport of the provisions of the law of the council, which stipulates that the convening authority shall take the convocation procedure one month prior to the opening of the council meeting. Meanwhile, in the Seoul High Court’s decision on the appointment of the members of the council, the Seoul High Court limits the exercise of authority by the temporary closing to obtain the permission of the Seoul High Court regarding the composition of the council and the convocation of the meeting for the election of the members of the council. In addition, in the Seoul High Court’s decision on the appointment of the members of the council, the Seoul High Court’s permission for the election of the members of the council of Seoul High Court did not appear in the permission, but did not appear in the above permission, so it is difficult to deem that the appointment of the president of the council of this case was scheduled.

(C) In addition, the president of the General Council is responsible for the overall administration and enforcement of the Defendant’s headquarters’s headquarters’s headquarters. The election of the president of the General Council is not only necessary for the daily operation but also for the most important functions of the highest executive organ that has a significant impact on the overall administration and administration of the Defendant headquarters’s headquarters’s headquarters.

Therefore, in the case of the subdivision for the election of the president of the General Affairs Office, fairness should be achieved by complying with the procedures of the subdivision. In particular, the defendant headquarters has been conducting normalization through strict procedures such as the appointment of temporary closures and the permission for election of the president of the General Affairs Office in order to terminate disputes over the nearest 20 years. Therefore, it is more necessary to comply with the resolution procedures regarding the election of the president of the General Affairs Office in this case, which must be necessarily required for the normalization of the defendant headquarters.

(3) Examining the above facts in light of such circumstances, in order to elect the chief secretary at the instant subdivision, it was necessary to inform the members of the subdivision of the subject matter of the meeting for a considerable period of not less than one month in advance and have them prepare in advance their opinions on whether to attend the instant subdivision or on the candidate’s recommendation and the candidate’s opposition to the decision on the election. (B) However, the instant subdivision convened the meeting without giving prior notice of the subject matter to elect the chief secretary, and made a resolution to elect Defendant 2 as the chief secretary in the presence of only some of the members of the subdivision, which was dissatisfied with the general legal principles on the procedures of the general assembly in an association which is not a juristic person and the purport of Article 17 of the Act, and the appointment of the chief secretary, which was based on such a resolution, shall be null and void.

(4) Nevertheless, by citing the first instance judgment, the lower court rejected the Plaintiffs’ assertion that the appointment of Defendant 2 was null and void, solely on the ground that there is no evidence to acknowledge in advance that the agenda should be notified in order to elect the president at the closing of the instant subdivision, the instant subdivision’s resolution to elect Defendant 2 as the president and the appointment of the president based on the said resolution.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the procedure for convening a branch meeting, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. The plaintiffs' ground of appeal assigning this error

3. Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below against Defendant 2 is reversed. Since this part of the judgment of the court below is sufficient for the court to directly render a judgment, the part against the above defendant among the judgment of the court of first instance is revoked, and all of the lawsuit against the above defendant is dismissed. (2) The judgment of the court below on the remaining grounds of appeal by the plaintiffs as to the part of the claim for confirmation of invalidation of appointment of the president of the General Affairs Office as to the defendant's original species among the judgment of the court below is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the court below for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. The remaining grounds of appeal as to the defendant's original species are dismissed, and the total costs of the lawsuit between the plaintiffs and the defendant 2 are borne by the losing party

Justices Kim So-young (Presiding Justice)