2. The plaintiff's remaining claims are dismissed.

3. Of the litigation costs, 70% is assessed against the Plaintiff, and the remainder is assessed against the Defendant, respectively.

4. Paragraph 1 can be provisionally executed.

The defendant asserts to the effect that the lawsuit of this case against the defendant is unlawful because the plaintiff was naturalizationed in Japan in 2006 and the state compensation against the foreigner is applied only when mutual guarantee exists with the relevant country.

On the other hand, Article 7 of the State Compensation Act provides that "this Act shall apply only when there is mutual guarantee with the relevant country in case where a foreigner is a victim." Considering that the plaintiff was born in Japan in 1943 and was a citizen of the Republic of Korea in April 6, 2006 after naturalization in Japan in 2006, there is no dispute between the parties concerned. However, as seen below, the defendant's tort cannot be viewed as loss of the plaintiff's claim against the defendant because the plaintiff was a citizen of the Republic of Korea, and the plaintiff lost the citizenship of the Republic of Korea. The reciprocity of the State Compensation Act does not require a treaty or agreement to explicitly stipulate that the victim's right to claim the State compensation is recognized as a law of the Republic of Korea of Korea between the two countries, and if it is possible for the victim's right to claim the State compensation, Article 7 of the State Compensation Act of the Republic of Korea applies to the plaintiff, and Article 6 of the State Compensation Act of Japan applies to the plaintiff.

2. Facts of recognition;

A. The plaintiff's status

On September 5, 1943, the Plaintiff was born in Japan on September 5, 194, and was enrolled in the control engineering of the National ○○ University and the control theory in the same graduate school, and completed the course of study on March 1, 1973 and completed the course of study in the medical department at △△ University and completed the course of study for two years.

B. The investigation process conducted by the central intelligence department (hereinafter “central body”).

1) On October 13, 1975, the Plaintiff prepared a written statement on October 17, 1975 at the dormitories of an affiliated hospital of Jongno-gu Seoul ( Address omitted) △ University without a warrant by the mid-term investigators. The Plaintiff was examined twice until October 26, 1975.

2) On November 1, 1975, China issued a detention warrant for the plaintiff on the same day and executed the above warrant by placing the plaintiff 17:00 on the same day to the Seoul detention center, and on November 20, 1975, sent the plaintiff to the Seoul District Prosecutors' Office under the National Security Act and under the suspicion of espionage in the public law.

C. The prosecution's investigation process and summary of the facts charged

1) The Seoul District Prosecutors' Office prepared four suspect interrogation guidelines against the Plaintiff by November 25, 1975, and filed a prosecution against the Plaintiff on December 9, 1975 with the Seoul Criminal District Court on charges of communication under the National Security Act, espionage, and locked in anti-public law.

2) The summary of the facts charged was that “Seong Union, which was connected with Cho Jong-gun and was engaged in activities with financial support from that organization, established the basic goal for the unification of the Republic of Korea, and was aware that its activities were conducted to achieve that purpose, and that it was an act of acts of agents by divulging national secrets collected in the Republic of Korea during the escape of the Republic of Korea, by joining the organization with the knowledge that it would be beneficial to anti-government organizations.”

(d) Trial process of a court;

The Seoul Criminal District Court held a six-time trial against the plaintiff and sentenced the plaintiff to imprisonment with prison labor for three years and six-months and suspension of qualifications for the plaintiff on April 30, 1976, and sentenced the plaintiff to a three-year and six-year and six-months. The Seoul High Court proceeded four-time trials and dismissed all appeals filed by the prosecutor and the defendant. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court below on the grounds that there is no evidence to reinforce the plaintiff's confession as well as the plaintiff's detection of state secrets in order to carry out the purpose under the order of △△△, an anti-government organization, and there is no evidence to prove the facts charged. The Seoul High Court released the plaintiff as bail on February 28, 197, and reversed the judgment of the court below on January 10, 1979 and acquitted the defendant on the ground that there is no evidence to prove the facts charged.

E. Investigation by the History History Settlement Commission for Truth and Reconciliation (hereinafter referred to as the “Reconciliation Commission”).

1) On August 17, 1976, the Plaintiff stated in the first public trial of the Seoul High Court that “The Plaintiff made a false statement under the circumstances in which it would have been investigated by an investigative agency.” However, this assertion was not accepted by the court.

2) The Plaintiff stated in the investigation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as follows.

A) At the time of being examined in the middle of the year, the family was not a visit, and the counsel was not notified of the right to interview, and the counsel was not allowed to interview.

나) 수사관들 세 사람이 교대로 몽둥이로 본인을 연거푸 구타해 가면서 자백을 요구했다. 구타의 지독한 고통과 긴장 하에서 멍하게 되어가는 뇌리에 어느 수사관의 외치는 ‘작설내 작살내’ 하는 고함소리가 들어왔다. 동물이라면 꼬리가 붙어 있는 장소를 심하게 맞았을 때, 온 몸이 이상하게 비틀거릴 것 같은 기절할까 싶은, 지금까지 경험하지 못했던 고통이었다. 고문으로 인한 육체의 고통에다가 캄캄한 신문실에서 며칠이 지나간지도 모르고 무엇이 어떻게 되어가는지도 모르는 공포심이 더하여 가서 극도의 고통과 공포심으로부터 피하기 위하여 수사관에게 ‘사실을 대라고 하시지만 아무것도 안했습니다. 그래도 사실을 대라고 하신다면 거짓말을 할 수 밖에 없습니다.’라고 말씀드리니, 수사관은 ‘써’라고 말했다. 본인은 007 영화를 연상하여 ‘일본의 어느 해변에 북한의 잠수함이 와 저를 데리고 갔다’는 말을 한 적도 있었다.

C) Here, one of them was threatened by the threat that he does not speak, and she was placed in the wall with her am and her part under the bottom of her clothes without any circumstances. In particular, when her am in the direction of the end, her knee and knee were the same as having no mind. In addition, she was suffering by inserting each item between knee and knee, and her knee and her gnee was left. The body that her gneeed was a hole, and was in the middle time until the hole her greed. The prosecutor did not make a threat that she would not speak in the middle time of promulgation. It was the time of promulgation. There was no other reason to make a false statement in such an atmosphere that does not listen to the truth.

(iii)decision of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission;

On July 23, 2010, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission decided that it is necessary for the Plaintiff to take appropriate measures for reconciliation, and to take appropriate measures for reconciliation.

[Reasons for Recognition] Unsatisfy, Gap evidence 1 to 5 (including satisfy number), the purport of the whole pleadings

3. Occurrence of liability for damages;

A. The defendant's tort and liability

1) Article 12(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea declares that “all citizens shall enjoy physical freedom,” and Article 12(2) provides that “All citizens shall not be subject to adviser and shall not be forced to make any statement unfavorable to themselves in criminal cases,” and also guarantees the fundamental rights of the people related to the freedom of their body by providing for the following: arrest and detention under the law, the principle of no punishment without the law and due process (main sentence of Article 12(1)), the prohibition of advisers and the right to refuse to make statements unfavorable to them (Article 12(2)); arrest and detention under a warrant issued by a judge (Article 12(3)); the right to receive assistance of counsel (Article 12(4)); the right to receive assistance of counsel (Article 12(5)); the legality of detention (Article 12(6)); limitation on admissibility of confessions (Article 12(7)).

2) Therefore, it is unlawful for an investigative agency to arrest and detain a suspect, etc. without a warrant of detention. The State should not engage in physical and mental harm by using direct and indirect means, such as adviser or intimidation, in order to receive a confession for criminal prosecution.

3) However, according to the above facts, the mid-term investigator forced the plaintiff, without complying with due process prescribed by the Constitution and the Criminal Procedure Act, and forced the plaintiff to proceed with the crime without a warrant of detention from October 13, 1975 to November 1 of the same year, and the family member's right to interview with counsel during the above period was not guaranteed, and he made the plaintiff make a false confession by committing cruel acts, such as beating or intimidation. Such series of acts, such as illegal confinement and cruel acts, committed by the mid-term investigator, who is a public official belonging to the defendant, constitute a tort, and such acts were committed with the appearance of the execution of duties called investigation against the counter-espionage, and thus, the defendant is obligated to compensate for mental suffering suffered by the plaintiff due to the series of illegal acts as above pursuant to Article 2(1) of the State Compensation Act.

4) Furthermore, the plaintiff asserted that the period from November 1, 1975 when the warrant of detention was issued to the Supreme Court to February 28, 1977, after being reversed and remanded to the purport of innocence, constituted an illegal confinement, and that there was a tort by the intelligence police officer, such as visiting the plaintiff and inspecting the plaintiff for at least two years and six months until he/she returned to Japan from the time he/she was released as bail. However, although it is difficult to recognize that the court's issuance of the warrant and the detention of the plaintiff as to the plaintiff constitutes a tort, there is no evidence to prove that there was an illegal inspection against the plaintiff, this part of the plaintiff's allegation in this part of the tort is without merit.

B. Judgment on the defendant's defense of extinctive prescription

1) The Defendant asserts that the Defendant’s claim for damages against the State due to a tort was terminated on January 10, 1979, which was rendered a judgment of innocence after the Plaintiff was released as bail, and that the Plaintiff’s claim for State compensation against the Defendant was extinguished by prescription at the time when 5 years have elapsed thereafter, since 3 years have elapsed since the victim became aware of the damage and the perpetrator, or 5 years have elapsed since the date of the tort.

2) However, the obligor’s exercise of the right of defense based on the statute of limitations is subject to the control of the principle of good faith and the prohibition of abuse of rights, which are the major principles of our Civil Act. As such, where there are special circumstances, such as: (a) the obligor has made it impossible or considerably difficult for the obligee to exercise his right or the interruption of prescription before the completion of the statute of limitations; (b) the obligor has acted to believe that such measures are unnecessary; or (c) the obligee has objectively obstructed the obligee from exercising his right; or (d) the obligor has made the right holder believe that the obligor would not invoke the statute of limitations after the completion of the statute of limitations; (b) there is a great need to protect the obligee; and (c) other creditors of the same conditions receive the repayment of the obligation; and (d) the obligor’s refusal of the statute of limitations is remarkably unfair or unfair, it cannot be allowed to assert the completion of the statute of limitations as abuse of rights against the principle of good faith (see

3) The plaintiff was illegally arrested and detained by a government agency, was subject to adviser by an investigative agency, and the court made a false confession as an adviser by the investigative agency, but the court did not receive any judgment from the court on the adviser. Although the judgment of innocence was rendered in the process of the trial, the reasons for innocence are that there was no evidence other than the plaintiff's confession, and thus, the judgment of innocence was not rendered on the grounds of illegal confinement and adviser's false confession. Under these circumstances, it is difficult for the plaintiff to secure it in the territory of the country where the perpetrator is the perpetrator, and under these circumstances, it is difficult to reasonably expect it from the perspective of ordinary people to file a lawsuit seeking compensation for damages with the de facto nation until the State was decided by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission established. Accordingly, it is reasonable to deem that there was an objective obstacle that the plaintiff could not exercise the right to claim damages due to the tort of this case until July 23, 2010, which affected the conclusion of extinctive prescription of the defendant's right to claim damages due to the tort of this case.

4. Scope of damages.

(a) Amount of consolation money;

Considering the contents and degree of the tort in this case, the age at the time of damage, family relationship, economic difficulty, etc., the situation after the damage, especially the protection of the people's human rights, in particular, was committed by the state power that should be considered as the basic responsibility, and thus, the illegal confinement and adviser was committed in a systematic manner by the state power; the plaintiff was entitled to file a claim for criminal compensation based on the judgment of innocence but the plaintiff did not claim for compensation; and considering all the circumstances revealed in the arguments in this case, such as the delayed compensation from the time of the tort until the time of closing argument in this case, and the change in monetary value, the amount of consolation money

B. Determination on the initial date of the damages for delay

In light of the fact-finding that the victim could continuously enjoy the legal interests suffered from tort if there was no other peremptory notice for performance, as a matter of principle, liability for damages arising from tort should be deemed to have occurred at the same time in light of the concept of fairness. However, in calculating consolation money, all circumstances that occurred until the time of the conclusion of fact-finding proceedings, as well as the national income level or monetary value, etc. should be reflected at the time of the conclusion of arguments. If the amount of consolation money is determined without any special change in the monetary value at the time of the occurrence of tort, it would be particularly problematic even if damages for delay occur at the time of the establishment of tort. However, if it is deemed that there was a considerable change in the monetary value at the time of the conclusion of arguments at the time of the tort and at the time of the conclusion of arguments, the damages for delay should be calculated at the time of the conclusion of arguments at the time of the conclusion of arguments at the time of the fact-finding proceedings (the foregoing change in the monetary value at the time of conclusion of arguments at the time of 20 months and the time of arguments.

In this regard, the defendant's above 2010Da35572 decision is in violation of Article 7 (1) 3 of the Court Organization Act even though it has changed its previous precedents (Supreme Court Decision 92Da48413, March 9, 1993; Supreme Court Decision 2004Da44552, March 12, 2004) explicitly stating that the starting point of the damages for delay is a tort. However, the above 2010Da3572 decision is divided into cases where the above 2010Da3572 and the above 207 Supreme Court decision was delivered to the Supreme Court since the above 205 Supreme Court decision was delivered to the effect that there is a significant possibility that there is a significant change in the value of monetary damages from the point of view of the above fact-finding decision to the effect that the above change in the value of monetary damages from the point of view of the above 200's own opinion and the above 200's own opinion can not be viewed as unlawful.

In the instant case, after the lapse of 30 years from the date of the instant tort until July 17, 2012, which was the date of the closing of argument, the price and national income level of Korea considerably increased and the monetary value, etc. at the time of the closing of argument in the instant case arose from the time of the closing of argument. Since the aforementioned recognized amount of consolation money reflects the monetary value, etc. at the time of the closing of argument in the instant case, damages for delay of the Defendant’s obligation to compensate for consolation money to the Plaintiff take place from July 17, 2012, which is the

C. Sub-committee

Therefore, the defendant is obligated to pay to the plaintiff 30,000,000 won and damages for delay calculated at the rate of 5% per annum under the Civil Act from July 17, 2012, which is the date of the closing of argument in this case, to August 21, 2012, which is the date of the judgment in this case, and 20% per annum under the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings, from the next day to the date of full payment.

5. Conclusion

Thus, the plaintiff's claim of this case is accepted within the scope of the above recognition, and the remaining claim is dismissed as it is without merit.

Judges Lee Du-won

(1) Article 7 (Exercise of Judgment Authority) (1) The judgment authority of the Supreme Court shall be conducted by a panel of not less than two-thirds of all the Justices of the Supreme Court, and it shall be the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court: Provided, That in a panel comprised of not less than three Justices of the Supreme Court, the case may be tried first and the case may be tried only if the opinion is agreed upon, except in the following cases: