2. Determination

A. In light of the fact that the sentencing based on the statutory penalty is a discretionary judgment made within a reasonable and reasonable scope, taking into account the factors that are the conditions for sentencing under Article 51 of the Criminal Act, and the fact that the sentencing is made after the appellate court’s ex post facto review nature, etc., it is reasonable to respect the sentencing in a case where there is no change in the conditions for sentencing compared with the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion. Although the sentencing of the first instance falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, it is desirable to reverse the first instance judgment on the sole ground that it is somewhat different from the appellate court’s view, and to refrain from imposing a sentence that is not different from the first instance judgment (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). (b) In light of the fact that the lower court did not submit new materials on sentencing in the health room and the first instance court’s trial on the instant case, and there is no change in the sentencing conditions compared with the lower court’s judgment, even if the Defendant’s history of traffic crimes and execution.

Therefore, the defendant's assertion is without merit.

3. In conclusion, the Defendant’s appeal is dismissed in accordance with Article 364(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act on the grounds that the appeal is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition (Article 37(1)2 and Article 50 of the Criminal Act on the ground that “Article 37(1)2 and Article 50 of the Criminal Act is a clerical error in the former part of Article 37, Article 38(1)2 and Article 50 of the Criminal Act (within the scope of the sum of the long-term punishments of each crime)” in the first sentence of Article 37, Article 38(1)2 and Article 50 of the Criminal Act.