Although there is no special reason to not disclose or notify the personal information of the illegal defendant who was exempted from disclosure or notification order, the judgment of the court below that exempted the disclosure or notification order is unfair.

Judgment

In a case where there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the first instance court as to the unfair argument of sentencing, and where the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to respect such a case (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). Based on the foregoing legal doctrine, there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the lower court’s judgment because new materials for sentencing have not been submitted in the trial, and in full view of the factors revealed in the arguments in the instant case, the lower court’s sentencing was too unfluent and so, exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion.

It does not appear.

This part of the appeal by the prosecutor is without merit.

In light of the Defendant’s age, occupation, social relationship, criminal record, and risk of recidivism (no record of a sexual crime), the circumstances leading to the instant crime and the details of the instant crime, and the degree and expected side effects of the Defendant’s disadvantage due to the instant disclosure and notification order, and the comparative balancing between the effect of the instant sexual crime subject to registration and the expected profits, there are special circumstances in which the Defendant’s personal information may not be disclosed and notified.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below to the same purport is justifiable.

This part of the appeal by the prosecutor is without merit.

In conclusion, the prosecutor's appeal is without merit, and it is in accordance with Article 364 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act.