All appeals filed by G and prosecutor are dismissed.

A. The first judgment on Defendant G’s Defendant G’s punishment (a fine of KRW 3 million, a surcharge of KRW 2.83 million) is too unreasonable.

B. Each of the punishments of the first and second original judgments against the Defendants by the public prosecutor (a fine of KRW 3 million, a fine of KRW 2.83 million, a surcharge of KRW 2.83 million, Defendant CG, H, I, and J: each fine of KRW 2 million, a surcharge of KRW 3.81 million, and a surcharge of KRW 3.81 million) is deemed unfair.

2. In light of the fact that the sentencing based on the statutory penalty is a discretionary judgment that takes place within a reasonable and appropriate scope, taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing under Article 51 of the Criminal Act, and the fact that the sentencing of the first instance court does not change in the conditions for sentencing compared with the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to respect it. Although the first instance court’s sentencing falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, it is desirable to reverse the first instance court’s judgment and to refrain from imposing a sentence that does not differ from the first instance court’s opinion on the grounds that it is somewhat different from

(2) In light of the legislative intent of the penal provision of this case where Defendant G’s act of distortion of an individual’s free will is punished on July 23, 2015, the Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015 (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260). First, the first instance judgment determined the sentence against Defendant G, taking into account the health care of the sentencing of Defendant G, the sentencing conditions favorable or unfavorable to Defendant G, and other circumstances prescribed in Article 51 of the Criminal Act, and there is no special change in the sentencing conditions compared to the lower judgment, and Defendant G is difficult to take economic measures, such as granting exemption from bankruptcy around 2014. On the other hand, considering the legislative intent of the penal provision of this case where Defendant G’s act of distortion of an individual’s free will is punished, the sentencing of the first lower judgment against