2. The plaintiff's claim against the designated person C.

A. In around 2003, the Plaintiff lent money to Nonparty D, a son of Nonparty D, to Nonparty D, a son, for stock investment, etc. several times.

B. Since then, as a result of the occurrence of a financial accident caused by the Selection C’s failure to repay the above loan, his father, who was his father on October 29, 2004, prepared and issued to the Plaintiff a written confirmation confirming that he would be liable for 50 million won out of the Selection C’s debt amount as the same debtor as the Selection C.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap 1 and 2's entries, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. According to the above facts of recognition as to the cause of the claim, the appointed person C is the primary debtor, barring any special circumstance, and the defendant is jointly and severally liable as a joint and several surety to pay the Plaintiff a loan of KRW 50 million and damages for delay.

3. Determination as to the Appointor C and the Defendant’s argument

A. The Appointed C asserted that the Plaintiff’s claim for the instant loan has expired. As such, the instant loan obligation is an obligation for which the period for payment has not been set, and thus, the extinctive prescription should run from the time the Plaintiff’s claim, which is the time when the right can be exercised (2003). Since it is apparent in the record that the Plaintiff’s lawsuit for the instant case was filed ten years from the said lawsuit was filed, barring any special circumstance, it shall be deemed that the extinctive prescription of the Plaintiff’s claim for the instant loan against the Appointed C has expired.

As to this, the Plaintiff urged the designated parties C to repay from time to time after lending the instant money, and thereafter, at the time when the Defendant drafted a written confirmation to the Plaintiff on October 29, 2004, the designated parties C also approved the Plaintiff’s obligation to repay the loan to the Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Plaintiff asserted that the extinctive prescription of the Plaintiff’s obligation to repay the loan to the designated parties C was suspended at that time, and thus, it is so argued that the period of extinctive prescription