The lower court sentenced a judgment on October 12, 2018, which was subsequent to the enforcement of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse (hereinafter “Revised Act”), which was amended by Act No. 15352, Jan. 16, 2018, and sentenced the Defendant to the same punishment as the first instance court pursuant to Articles 3 and 56(1) of the Addenda of the amended Act, and, at the same time, issued an employment restriction order for three years, did not have any particular disadvantage to the Defendant, rather than maintaining the first instance court judgment.

(see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2018Do13367, Oct. 25, 2018). Therefore, we cannot accept the allegation in the grounds of appeal that the lower judgment erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration.

In addition, the defendant argues that the court below's punishment is excessive, and that limiting the cases where Article 383 subparagraph 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act can be deemed as grounds for appeal of unfair sentencing violates the principle of excessive prohibition, and that it is unconstitutional against the principle of equality.

However, Article 383 subparag. 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act that limits the grounds for appeal on the grounds of unfair sentencing cannot be deemed as a violation of Article 101(2) of the Constitution or the constitutional provision that limits the right of citizens to a trial by the Supreme Court or an unconstitutional provision contrary to the equality principle.

(see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2007Do1808, Apr. 26, 2007). Therefore, the Defendant’s aforementioned assertion is nothing more than the purport that the sentence imposed by the lower court is too unreasonable.

According to Article 383 subparagraph 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act, only in cases where death penalty, life imprisonment, or imprisonment or imprisonment without prison labor for more than ten years is imposed, an appeal on the grounds of unfair sentencing is allowed. Thus, in this case where a more minor sentence is imposed on the defendant, the argument that the punishment is too unreasonable is not a legitimate ground for appeal

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.