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(영문) 울산지방법원 2017.03.30 2016구합6522

영업정지처분취소

Text

1. On January 12, 2015, the Defendant’s imposition of a penalty surcharge in lieu of seven days of business suspension against the Plaintiff shall be revoked.

Reasons

1. Details of the disposition;

A. The Plaintiff is operating an entertainment drinking house (hereinafter “instant business”) with the trade name “C” in Ulsan-gu, Ulsan-gu.

B. On October 11, 2014, around 06:20 on October 11, 2014, the Defendant issued a disposition of business suspension for two months against the Plaintiff, pursuant to Article 75 of the Food Sanitation Act and Article 89 of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act, on January 12, 2015, on the ground that D, an employee of the Plaintiff, provided alcoholic beverages to two juveniles, such as E and F, within the instant business establishment.

C. On January 20, 2015, the Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal against the above disposition. On October 6, 2016, the Ulsan Metropolitan City Administrative Appeals Commission rendered a ruling changing the above disposition to the imposition of a penalty surcharge in lieu of the seven days of business suspension.

(hereinafter referred to as “instant disposition”), which was changed by the above ruling on January 12, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as “instant disposition”). / [Grounds for recognition] without dispute, entry in Gap evidence 1, 2, and 7, and the purport of the whole pleadings.

2. Whether the disposition is lawful;

A. Although the Plaintiff’s assertion that the Plaintiff provided alcoholic beverages to juveniles, at the time, the Plaintiff did not recognize that the Plaintiff was a juvenile who provided alcoholic beverages, and there was no negligence with regard thereto, the instant disposition was unlawful because it did not constitute grounds for disposition or abused discretion.

B. The administrative order punishment is a punishment imposed on the objective fact that it is a violation of the duty to maintain the administrative order, and therefore, it is not a real offender, but a person prescribed by the law as a person in charge of the violation in principle. However, in principle, it is not unreasonable for the violator to be aware of the duty, and thus, it cannot be imposed if there is a justifiable reason not to cause the failure to perform the duty, such as when there are circumstances where it is unreasonable for the violator to present it properly, or when there is a circumstance where it is unreasonable to expect the party to perform the duty.

Supreme Court Decision 98Du597 delivered on May 26, 2000