Litigation costs shall be borne by the plaintiff.

On April 4, 1970, the fact that the registration of ownership transfer has been made on the above farmland by Nonparty 3 (a sales contract) and No. 4 (a registration right) does not conflict between the parties, and that the above farmland was made on March 11, 1970 and the Plaintiff concluded a sales contract with the Plaintiff on March 11, 1970 and paid the above price in full at that time, taking full account of the following facts: (a) the statement of No. 3 (a sales contract) and No. 4 (a registration right) and the testimony of the witness Lee Jong-chul-sung (the Plaintiff held the above No. 4). As to the above farmland on March 11, 1970; (b) the Plaintiff was residing in Seoul, and was unable to directly cultivate the above farmland on the ground that the Plaintiff was residing in the area where the above farmland was located, and thus, the fact that the registration of ownership transfer was made under the name of the Defendant by mutual consent with the Defendant (the Plaintiff’s husband’s husband).

The plaintiff asserted that the title trust relationship with the above farmland was established by the above sale and registration, and that the above title trust was terminated by the service of the complaint in this case and sought the implementation of the procedure for ownership transfer registration as a result thereof, the defendant asserted that the above title trust agreement cannot be asserted and that the plaintiff cannot respond to the above claim on the ground that he did not receive the certificate of farmland sale.

According to the above sales and registration circumstances, it is reasonable to interpret that a title trust agreement has been entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant with respect to the above farmland. However, in this case where the plaintiff is the person who has been subject to no certification of farmland sale since the time of the above sales contract, the sale and purchase between the plaintiff and the defendant and the above pathy. The above title trust agreement between the defendant can be directly purchased and sold without the certification of farmland sale by the government office at the location of the location. The above certification is the so-called public law authorization that the government office at the location of the farmland sale and grants the consent in order to realize the ideology of the light-to-be freedom, which is the legislative purpose of the Farmland Reform Act, as long as the above certification of farmland sale and the sale without the above certification is not effective within the extent that it goes against the legislative purpose of the Farmland Reform Act (see Supreme Court Decision 84Da75, Nov. 13, 1984). Thus, the purchaser of the above farmland sale without the above certification cannot obtain the ownership transfer registration of the above farmland within the extent of the sale registration procedure.

In the case of a claim for ownership transfer registration based on the cancellation of title trust, it is clear in light of the Supreme Court decision that the truster is required to obtain a certificate of farmland sale with the purchaser as the external creditor in the case of a sale security (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 78Da58, Feb. 13, 1979) (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 66Da183, Apr. 6, 196). Furthermore, the Supreme Court decision differs from this case, which states that all necessary requirements for farmland ownership under the Farmland Reform Act should be satisfied (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 66Da183, Apr. 6, 1966). In addition, the farmland acquisition by a person who acquired farmland and completed the ownership transfer registration under title trust with another person without any intention to cultivate the farmland at the time of application of the former Civil Act, which is the mandatory law, cannot be claimed for the execution of the above farmland ownership transfer registration procedure before obtaining the above certification from the defendant.

Even if the defendant purchased the above farmland with the plaintiff's money originally, he cannot respond to the plaintiff's request for registration because the defendant acquired the above farmland by prescription. Thus, as long as the above sale and title trust cannot take effect within the extent that it goes against the legislative intent of the Farmland Reform Act, the defendant's request for registration should be dismissed without examining whether or not the above farmland has been acquired by prescription. However, the above argument by the defendant is related to the plaintiff's request for farmland transfer as seen earlier, and it would be helpful to clarify the legal relationship between the defendant. Therefore, it is important to determine whether or not the above argument by the defendant is related to the plaintiff's claim for farmland transfer, and it is necessary to hold the trustee's possession in the trust relation to the acquisition by prescription. Therefore, the defendant cannot acquire by prescription even if he cultivates the above farmland by nature of his title. Thus, the above argument by the defendant is groundless.

2. Determination as to the request for extradition of farmland

The plaintiff purchased the above farmland from the above fump and let the defendant cultivate the above farmland in title trust, while enabling the defendant to cultivate the above farmland constantly, and at any time, the plaintiff agreed to the effect that at any time the above loan may be terminated. The plaintiff terminated the above loan of use with the delivery of the complaint in this case and demanded the defendant to deliver the above farmland to the defendant who is the user owner as the creditor who is the user owner in the status of the creditor who is the user owner. Thus, according to the witness's testimony, it is recognized that the plaintiff entered into a loan agreement with the plaintiff's principal in title trust between the defendant.

However, the above loan agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant is based on the premise that the above loan agreement between the plaintiff and the above gympum and the validity of the above loan agreement between the defendant. Thus, not only the purchase of farmland by non-farmers but also the possession and profit therefrom are contrary to the legislative intent of the Farmland Reform Act (Article 17 of the Farmland Reform Act), the above sale, trust agreement, and loan agreement cannot be null and void. Thus, the plaintiff (the above facts, the plaintiff's intention to cultivate the above farmland is no longer and there is no ability to do so according to the purport of the argument and the whole purport of the argument) cannot be claimed against the defendant for delivery of farmland for the reason that the above loan is terminated (the plaintiff cannot seek delivery of farmland for the reason that the title trust is terminated).

If such a different interpretation is made, a person without intention and capacity for self-defense leases farmland to a trustee using a title trust without completing the registration of transfer of ownership in his/her own future, and if he/she refuses to do so, he/she may request the trustee to transfer the farmland against the trustee and lease the farmland to another person as high as a higher rent. Since the ownership relationship and the use and profit relationship in the registry are complicated due to the disparity between the ownership relationship and the use and profit relationship in the registry, practical use and profit-making relationship in the above farmland trust relationship is entrusted to the trustee who is a farmer, and it is reasonable to adjust the legal relationship between the truster and the trustee as unjust enrichment return (i.e., the truster's right to request for extradition).

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff cannot request the transfer of ownership as to the above farmland unless the certificate of farmland sale is duly obtained. Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is without merit and it is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Equitable Award