As such, Defendant’s act does not constitute “inducing patients for profit” prohibited under Article 27(3) of the Medical Service Act, since it does not fundamentally undermine the order of the medical market.

2) The Defendant was unaware of the fact that his act constitutes a “act of soliciting patients” prohibited under the Medical Service Act.

Therefore, there is a perception that the defendant had the intention or illegality of the crime.

subsection (b) of this section.

2. Determination 1) The Defendant asserted the same assertion in the lower court.

The lower court determined that Defendant’s act constitutes the act of discounting the principal’s charge, which is explicitly prohibited under the main sentence of Article 27(3) of the Medical Service Act, constitutes an act of attracting patients who significantly undermine the order of the medical market.

In light of the following circumstances acknowledged by the evidence duly adopted and examined by the lower court and the first instance court, the lower court’s determination rejecting the Defendant’s assertion is justifiable.

① On August 10, 2016, the Defendant filed a petition for adjudication on the constitutionality of the part of “an act of exempting or discounting the principal’s apportionment” under Article 27(3) of the Medical Service Act (hereinafter “instant provision”).

The Defendant asserted that the part of the instant provision in the “act of discounting one’s own charge” is against the principle of clarity of the criminal statutoryism and infringes on freedom of occupation in violation of the principle of excessive prohibition, because it is difficult to understand whether the said provision and the prohibition provision on medical advertising are an example of one type of “act of soliciting patients” or not.

However, the Constitutional Court on December 28, 2017.