A. On November 7, 1978, request for the cancellation of registration of each transfer of ownership as described in paragraph (1) of the order of each transfer of ownership based on the sale and purchase agreement of the conditions of return of ownership when felling standing trees.

(b) Articles 208(3)2 and 150(3) of the Civil Procedure Act of the judgment of deemed confession

2. Determination as to each claim against Defendant C and D

A. (1) As to the instant real estate owned by the Plaintiff, each transfer registration under B was completed on October 26, 1978 on the ground of a sales contract made on October 26, 1978, with respect to the instant real estate owned by the Plaintiff.

(2) Thereafter, regarding the instant real estate, the name of the Defendant C, which was caused by the sale and purchase on March 3, 1980 on June 12, 1980, and the name of the Defendant C, April 18, 198, appears to have been written in writing in 1987.

4. Each registration of ownership transfer, such as the description of each claim in Defendant D’s name, was completed on the ground of the sale of 14.14.

(Ground for recognition: Facts without dispute, entries in Gap evidence 1 through 3 (including each number; hereinafter the same shall apply) and the purport of the whole pleadings

B. The plaintiff's main claim and judgment on the plaintiff's main claim (1) The plaintiff sold the standing timber of this case to B on November 7, 1978 at KRW 3.5 million, and completed the registration of ownership transfer in the name of B for punishment, but upon completion of felling trees, the registration title of the above real estate should be returned to the plaintiff.

However, B did not return the name of the pertinent real estate to the Plaintiff and entrusted the Defendants with the name thereof. Since the title trust agreement between B and the Defendants and each transfer of ownership between the Defendants is null and void, the Defendants are obligated to cancel each of the above registration of the Plaintiff, who subrogated the right to cancel each registration against the Defendants in B.

(2) However, the written evidence No. 10 alone is insufficient to recognize that B had held the instant real estate title trust with the Defendants, and it may otherwise be recognized.