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(영문) 의정부지방법원 고양지원 2018.12.21 2018가합74160

대여금

Text

1. The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff KRW 325,00,000 and the interest rate of KRW 15% per annum from July 13, 2018 to the date of full payment.

Reasons

1. Comprehensively taking account of the overall purport of the statements and arguments by Gap evidence Nos. 1 through 6 as to the cause of the claim, the deceased B (hereinafter “the deceased”) prepared the loan certificate of May 25, 2009 (the evidence No. 3, hereinafter “the loan certificate of this case”) with the purport that the Plaintiff borrowed KRW 325,00,000 from the Plaintiff. Since the deceased’s death on May 3, 2016 and the existence of the heir is unclear, it can be acknowledged that the Defendant was appointed as an administrator of inherited property of the deceased under the Seoul Family Court Decision No. 2016Hun-Ba1153.

According to the above facts, the defendant, who is an administrator of inherited property of the deceased, is obligated to pay to the plaintiff 325,000,000 won and damages for delay at the rate of 15% per annum from July 13, 2018 to the day of complete payment, which is the day following the delivery of a copy of the payment order in this case.

2. The Defendant’s argument regarding the Defendant’s assertion: (a) the Plaintiff transferred the sum of KRW 322,697,540,000 from the instant loan certificate to D et al., not the Deceased; and (b) as long as the interest on the loan was repaid by D, the Plaintiff’s claim for the loan is alleged to be a claim against D, not the Deceased; (c) however, the statement on the evidence No. 1 alone lacks the probative value of the instant loan certificate, which is a disposal document,

Rather, comprehensively taking account of the overall purport of evidence Nos. 1, 6, and 12 as well as the overall purport of the statements and arguments by the deceased, it appears that the deceased and D received money from the plaintiff in the name of D to raise business funds for twenty years, and that D was partly repaid interest. The deceased were able to comprehensively delegate D with regard to the disposal of the deceased’s property to D immediately before the death, and D was wholly liable to the Plaintiff on May 17, 2016 after the deceased’s death.