On the first ground for appeal

In light of the records, we affirm and accept the fact-finding by the court below as to the preparation process of Eul evidence No. 1 and the nature of money and valuables paid by the defendant to the plaintiffs from October 17, 1989, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding facts against the rules of evidence, and there is no reason to dispute this issue.

On the second ground for appeal

The evidence No. 1 is prepared by Song-dae, the chairperson of the defendant company's trade union at the time and by the defendant's new executive director representing the defendant, and it is clear that it does not contain any negotiation contents between the labor and management on the standards for working conditions of the workers belonging to the defendant, and therefore, it cannot be deemed a collective agreement. Thus, it is not reasonable to discuss Eul's evidence No. 1 on the premise that it is a collective agreement.

In addition, since the representative of a trade union expresses externally the intention of a trade union on behalf of a trade union, and internally executes the affairs of a trade union, it cannot be said that the representative of a trade union agrees to arrange the employment of a dismissed worker between the employer and the employer, and it cannot be said that it is disadvantageous to the dismissed worker, and therefore, it is not reasonable to discuss this issue.

In addition, according to the records, while the defendant, who is the representative of the trade union at the time, was to be reinstated in terms of labor-management harmony between the above orderer and the above orderer, to exclude the plaintiffs who had instigated the labor-management division of the defendant's workplace even after retirement from among the dismissed workers, the defendant agreed to provide job placement services to the plaintiffs at a humanitarian level and prepared Eul evidence No. 1 of the above contents, and otherwise formally, the defendant's failure to disclose Eul evidence No. 1 of the actual contents of the agreement to externally due to the illegal strike caused by the plaintiff's main behavior, such as the plaintiff's severe managerial impact such as the loss of the degree of suffering from the survival crisis, and even if Gap's certificate No. 1 does not include a provision to reinstate the plaintiffs formally differently from the actual agreement, it cannot be viewed that the plaintiffs' withdrawal of the above order or other reasons are contrary to the good customs and order of labor-management regulations of the defendant's workplace which had experienced for a long time in the year 1989 cannot be seen as being contrary to the good customs and good faith.

On the third ground for appeal

On April 1, 1994, the legal representative of the plaintiffs stated that the plaintiffs' claim for confirmation of employee status and wage of this case was based on the premise that the employee status has been restored by the evidence No. 1 agreement. It is clear that the plaintiffs' legal representative' claim was made to the same effect as the application for correction of the purport of the claim and appeal as of April 8, 1994 and January 3, 1995, and the preparatory document as of October 13, 1994, respectively. Thus, the grounds for appeal that the theory of lawsuit is in dispute for the reasons that are not contained in the court below's decision, and it cannot be a legitimate ground for appeal. It is without merit.

Therefore, all appeals by the plaintiffs are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing parties. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Ahn Yong-sik (Presiding Justice)